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"Neither Fish, Nor Flesh, Nor Good Red
Herring" Lok Adalats: An Experiment
in Informal Dispute Resolution in India
By SARAH LEAH WHITSON*
The Indian legal system's most recent experiment in alternative dis-
pute resolution (ADR) has fallen short of its stated aims to "indigenize"
the formal legal system inherited from Britain and to extend legal protec-
tion to the poor. While the reasons for this failure are intricately tied to
its unique legal context, India's experience with ADR validates standard
critiques of similar Western experiments in informal justice.
The Indian Constitution calls on the national government to pro-
mote modern values of equality and non-discrimination. At the same
time, it directs the state to foster local government and judicial self-ad-
ministration consistent with traditional values and mores that often pro-
mote inequality and discrimination. This latter directive fueled
advocates of ADR, who criticized the formal legal system as adversarial,
procedurally inflexible, and inconsistent with a purported native prefer-
ence for informal local conciliation.
The Lok Adalats (the L.A. courts), literally "people's courts," repre-
sent the latest attempt to reform the Indian legal system by emphasizing
informal justice. Administered through the legal aid program, the L.A.
courts were designed to provide speedy and informal resolution of dis-
putes through conciliation and mediation at the local level. Scholars,
judges, and the newly-developed legal aid bureaucracy promoted L.A.
courts as a popular innovation with tremendous promise to "indigenize"
legal proceedings.
However, many of these advocates expected the L.A. courts to en-
force equality and non-discrimination rather than local mores. Their
ambivalence towards local control and prejudices is reflected in the in-
creasing formalization of the L.A. courts. The L.A. courts became a hy-
* Associate, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York, N.Y.; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1991; B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1988. The author has recently partici-
pated in the Harvard Study Team's studies of the impact of the war on civilian casualties in
Iraq.
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brid of central control and indigenous conciliation, and lost support
among the population they were designed to serve. As a result, the L.A.
courts have become, like previous attempts to create informal legal
mechanisms in India, another "moribund institution."' These failures
evidence the tension inherent in India's effort to extend the authority of
its modern constitutional values while purporting to promote popular
participation in and access to justice.
This Article examines the theoretical and practical development of
the L.A. courts in the context of the history of legal aid and experimental
legal systems in India. The Article then reviews the functioning of L.A.
courts and similar programs in four Indian states,2 and compares L.A.
courts to nyaya panchayats (N.P.s), the informal judicial branches of lo-
cal governments set up by the central state. Finally, it assesses the appli-
cability of general critiques of ADR to the specific experience of L.A.
courts in India. Because of the near identity of the Indian and Anglo-
American legal systems, the Indian experiment provides an interesting
control study on the rhetoric and reality of legal informalism.
I. LEGAL AID AND LOK ADALATS: A HISTORY
The L.A. court movement is a product of decades of deliberation
and experimentation with methods of providing a wider segment of the
population with access to the legal system in India. As an outgrowth of
the legal aid movement, it shares much of its rationale and purposes.
The history and development of the crusade to provide legal aid in India
explain the particular development, goals, and purposes of the L.A.
courts.
The movement for legal aid in India initially grew out of judicial
and scholarly concern about the need to provide free legal defense to
those charged with criminal offenses. British judges noticed the need for
1. Catherine Meschievitz & Marc Galanter, In Search of Nyaya Panchayats: The Politics
of a Moribund Institution, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 44-77. (Richard Abel ed,,
1982). The article describes how nyaya panchayats, the judicial branch of the state instituted
local organization schemes, had become "moribund" despite continued ideological loyalty to
the institution. Meschievitz and Galanter first used this term to describe nyaya panchayats, the
failed experiment with informal local courts that immediately preceded L.A. courts.
2. In 1989, I had the opportunity to work with the Center for Implementing Legal Aid
Schemes (CILAS), which is the national legal aid supervisory agent, and to visit the legal aid
programs of four states: Maharashstra, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and Delhi. In each
state, I met with the directors and staff of the state legal aid programs, the states and district
judges who monitored and participated in the legal aid programs, members of the bar associa-
tions, lawyers, judges, academics, and litigants. Fortunately, Aditi Pratap accompanied me at
almost all times, and served to interpret from Hindi some interviews with litigants.
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such assistance, and some isolated voluntary organizations set up funds
to finance the legal fees of a few criminally charged indigents.
The first and most comprehensive inquiry into the problem of pro-
viding free legal assistance came just after independence in 1949. The
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Bhagwati, directed this in-
quiry through the Committee on Legal Aid and Legal Advice in the State
of Bombay.' The Committee concluded that legal aid was "a Govern-
mental responsibility and... concluded that the principles of equality
before the law and equal protection of the law as laid down in Article 14
of the Indian Constitution put a duty on the State to provide aid to all
the citizens .... , A continuing series of state and nationally sponsored
reports on the need for a government legal aid program followed this first
report.
In 1958 the Law Commission of India presented a significant report
on the legal system entitled Reform of Judicial Administration. This re-
port emphasized the failure of the Government to move forward with
any system for providing legal assistance to the indigent: "Legal aid...
has unfortunately been regarded as of very minor importance," 5 but "the
rendering of legal aid to the poor litigant is a question of fundamental
character."6
Also in 1959, a consideration of the problem of providing for the
"rule of law in free society" resulted in the recognition by the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists of "the need for the state to ensure legal
counsel to all."7
[A] full review of the means to implement this demand was made by
the Committee on Legal Aid at the Third All-India Law Conference in
1962 .... [T]he committee outlined a comprehensive national pro-
gramme providing for the establishment of legal aid committees in all
districts of the country. The Committee suggested state participation
in the scheme with aid in all criminal cases where the defendant could
not engage counsel, and gradual extension of aid in civil cases as well.8
As the Law Ministry took steps to implement a legal aid program,
3. Oliver G. Koppell, Legal Aid in India, 8 J. OF THE INDIAN L INsr. 224. 225 (1966).
Bhagwati was then a judge of the Bombay High Court.
4. GOV'T OF MADHYA PRADESH, REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR
LEGAL AID SCHEME, A PROTECTING ARM OF THE STATE 10 (1975) [hereinafter GOV'T OF
MADHYA PRADESH].
5. LAW COMMISSSION OF INDIA, FOURTEENTH REPORT - REFORM OF JUDICIAL AD-
MINISTRATION 589 (1958).
6. Id. at 587.
7. Koppel, supra note 3, at 225.
8. Id, at 226.
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the Emergency of 1962 intervened. Only the Supreme Court complied
with the constitutional demand for legal aid in its rules for criminal
cases. Because of the constitutional requirement for legal aid in criminal
cases, states only provided legal aid to individuals accused of capital of-
fenses. The states of Kerala and Maharashtra, which were the most ac-
tive in their early implementation of limited legal aid schemes, had legal
aid programs run largely by private organizations. 9
In 1966 the Law Ministry justified the absence of any national
scheme for the provision of free legal services with the belief that individ-
ual states had the responsibility for providing legal aid. "Administration
of Justice is a subject included in the State List and the grant of legal aid
and assistance to the poor is, therefore, primarily the responsibility of the
State Governments .... 1O
In the 1970s the calls for establishing a national legal aid scheme
became more urgent. The National Conference on Legal Aid of 1970
once again discussed the problems of legal aid and insisted on legislation
to make provision of legal aid a statutory obligation for the states. Jus-
tice Bhagwati, who led the crusade, saw the role of legal aid as part of a
grander scheme for social justice.
Bhagwati headed the first major state commission in Gujarat organ-
ized to consider a program for legal aid. The Gujarat Committee's re-
port, later called the Bhagwati Committee report, was perhaps the most
important in identifying an ideological framework in support of legal aid;
it argued that poverty was intimately linked to the lack of legal assistance
and access to the courts. Bhagwati introduced his notion of "strategic"
legal services, which urged that legal aid should be not only "remedial"
but also "preventive." The "Preventive Legal Services" Programme
"aim[ed] at prevention and elimination of... various kinds of injustices
which the poor as a class suffer; ... involve[d] radical, multi-dimensional
use of lawyer skills for protection of group interests; ... recognize[d] the
interrelation between law and socio-economic problems of poverty."
' II
Throughout his involvement with legal aid programs in India,
Bhagwati emphasized the need to provide legal assistance to individual
claimants, and the importance of using law to transform the socio-eco-
nomic status of the poor and oppressed. This strategic/preventive arm of
9. Id. at 228-31.
10. MINISTRY OF LAW, JUSTICE & COMPANY AFFAIRS, GOV'T OF INDIA, REPORT OF
THE EXPERT COMMITFEE ON LEGAL AID: PROCESSUAL JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE 4 (1973)
[hereinafter GOV'T OF INDIA].
11. Madhava N.R. Menon, Legal Aid and Justice.for the Poor, in LAW AND POVERTY:
CRITICAL ESSAYS 352 (Upendra Baxi ed., 1988).
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the legal aid program required expansive legal literacy and group legal
action campaigns, as well as the novel "public interest litigation." Justice
Bhagwati promoted the development of public interest litigation through
decisions mandating innovative standing and evidentiary rules and pro-
cedures, which allowed almost anyone to bring a case on behalf of the
public interest.
Other judges shared Bhagwati's belief in using the legal system to
pursue a vision of social justice. These members of the judiciary, sup-
ported by a number of scholars, believed that the law and the legal sys-
tem could be used for certain ends, and that judges could and should take
an active role in pursuing both the means of expanding access to the legal
system and the ends of creating a more just social and economic order.
Following the Bhagwati Committee report, the Government of In-
dia appointed Justice V.K. Krishna Iyer as chairman of a committee to
study the implementation of legal aid. Justice Iyer was also one of the
vocal proponents of using the law for social justice, and one of the most
liberal Supreme Court Justices of India. His committee submitted its
report in 1976, recommending a free legal aid scheme, a National Legal
Services Authority accountable to Parliament, simplification of legal pro-
cedure, and emphasis on conciliated settlements outside court."2
Iyer's report briefly noted that conciliation and informal dispute res-
olution should be part of the legal aid scheme. "[O]ut-of-court concilia-
tion and settlement will be key tactics of the scheme, dictated by its
clients' limited resources of time and money, and the difficulties of suc-
cessfully negotiating the court system which all litigants face."13 Fur-
thermore, the report stipulated that an agreement to "a just compromise
as certified by the Legal Aid Committee" would be made a "condition
precedent" to a party's receipt of legal aid. 4
Support for conciliation and settlement of disputes outside the offi-
cial courts was not new among those interested in reforming the Indian
legal system. In fact, wide-scale experimentation with informal dispute
resolution had occurred through the N.P.s. Iyer's report saw the N.P.s
as arenas where conciliation and settlement could be promoted, and
urged extension of their jurisdiction.' 5 The Committee further recom-
mended the establishment of tribunals where settlements and decisions
could be made quickly, under rules calling for expedited procedures in
cases where the dispute centered upon compensation, similar to the Mo-
12. See generally Gov'T OF INDIA, supra note 10.
13. Id. at 17.
14. See id at 62-63.
15. Id at 39-58.
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tor Vehicles Tribunals established in a few states.6
American experimentation in the 1960s and 1970s with "neighbor-
hood legal centers" for small, community disputes and with arbitration
contributed to the Committee's emphasis on conciliation and alternative
dispute resolution. 17 Liberal American legal theory played an important
role in the development of the Indian schemes for legal aid and legal
reform; many Indian academics and judges returned from the United
States persuaded by what they saw as favorable legal developments in
America. I" Thus, it is not strange that Justice Iyer quoted American
Supreme Court Justice Burger on the need for local mechanisms of dis-
pute resolution and how to build them: "[W]e could consider the value of
a tribunal consisting of three representative citizens,.., and vest in them
final unreviewable authority to decide certain kinds of minor claims.
Flexibility and informality should be the keynote in such tribunals, and
they should be available at a neighbourhood or community level.. ,,"9
Similarly, Justice Iyer used the American experience to show how a
promising, informal legal system could go wrong:
The Arbitration Society sponsored a Public Tribunal of Justice, 'a Peo-
ple's Tribunal,' for prompt, inexpensive settlement of all civil ... con-
troversies.... [I]t was promoted as a 'common sense proceeding' in
which 'the facts alone will prevail ... unshackled by legal rules and
considered by arbitrators who aim at simple justice without regard to
legal technicalities'. . .. But as arbitration became more deeply en-
meshed in the legal system.... the advantages of an informal alterna-
tive form of dispute settlement receded.20
Critique of the formal legal system, on the other hand, had become a
cottage industry; the need to reform the Anglo-Indian legal system to
suit better the needs of the population provided the underlying premise
for discussion of possible changes. Arguments for a different system
stemmed from feelings that the adjudicative system introduced by the
British was inappropriate to Indian life and from the recognition that the
formal system itself had too many problems.
Almost from the establishment of British courts in India, it was appar-
16. Id. at 58.
17. Richard Abel, Introduction, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL. JUSTICE, supra note 1,
at 2-7.
18. Upendra Baxi, Understanding the Traffic of 'Ideas' Between America and India, in
THE TRAFFIC OF IDEAS BETWEEN INDIA AND AMERICA (Robert M. Crunden ed., 1985).
19. V.R. KRISHNA IYER, LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITIES ACT - A CRITIQUE 19
(Madurai: Society for Community Organization Trust ed., 1988).
20. Id. at 23.
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ent to the British that there were serious faults in these courts. It took
years for disputes to be resolved, and there were too many appeals
from lower courts. Use of forged documents and perjury in the courts
became endemic. It was evident that courts did not settle disputes, but
were used either as a form of gambling on the part of legal speculators
who were landlords or merchants and who turned to the courts to
wrest property from the 'rightful' owners, or as a threat in a dispute.2 1
These problems stemmed from the fundamental differences between
the indigenous mechanisms for dispute settlement and the foreign legal
system imposed on the country.
[T]he present attitude of the Indian peasant was an inevitable conse-
quence of the British decision to establish courts in India patterned on
British procedural law. The way a people settles disputes is part of its
social structure and value system. In attempting to introduce British
procedural law into their Indian courts, the British confronted the In-
dians with a situation in which there was a direct clash of the values of
the two societies and the Indians in response thought only of manipu-
lating the new situation and did not use the courts to settle disputes
but only to further them.22
The British legal system was regarded by critics as "something undesir-
able" substantively because it remained "at variance with the accepted
moral standards of social behavior," and procedurally, because it is
overly complex.3'
Among the conflicting norms and values, British notions of equality,
as expressed in the court's treatment of parties exclusively as complain-
ant and defendant-equal under the law irrespective of their statuses or
relationships in society-were often contrasted to a traditional
panchayat's considerations of caste and status when mediating disputes.
The jural postulates that underlie the British-introduced courts--
equality in the eyes of the law, judicial ignorance of the complainants,
the idea that economic relations are based on contract not status, the
goal of settling the case at hand and only that case, and the necessity of
a clear cut decision rather than a compromise-were at odds with the
wide range of adjudication procedures followed in the villages of
India.
24
21. Bernard Cohn, Some Notes on Law and Change in Northern India, 8 ECON. DEv. &
CULTURAL CHANGE 79, 90 (1959).
22. Idt
23. R.S. Khare, Indigenous Culture and Lawyer's Law in India, 14 Co.MP. STUD. IN Soc'
& HIST. 71, 79 (1972).
24. Bernard Cohn, Anthropological Notes on Disputes and Law in India, 67 Am. AN rHRO-
POLOGIST 82, 105 (special publication) (1965).
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Furthermore, dissatisfaction existed with the way Indians used their
rights and the legal system to manipulate the courts for ends that had
little to do with the legal issues or rights involved. This behavior was
attributed to the Indian population's superficial and artificial understand-
ing of the foreign British system, which inhibited the use of the legal
system for its intended purposes.
[N]ew rights and duties were created-through the introduction of
new ideas about landed property, through the workings of the revenue
system (by the underassessing of some villages and estates and the
overassessing of others), and, in some areas of North India, through
the auctioning of land to realize unpaid taxes. These rights and duties
were differentially understood by those immediately affected by
them.... [To the villager, the rights and wrongs in a case were secon-
dary to his ability to manipulate the court through access to minor
court officials, the hiring of clever lawyers, the fabrication of evidence,
and the marshalling of false witnesses.
25
Critics cited the British procedural focus on deciding each case sepa-
rately and independently of other cases or circumstances, with a desig-
nated winner and loser. This aspect is described in the literature as
diverging detrimentally from the panchayat system of urging compro-
mise in order to maintain community harmony. The British system also
contrasts with thepanchayat tradition of deciding a case only in the con-
text of the dispute, often part of a history of disputes and disagreements
between the parties' castes, tribes, or families.26
Despite the resort to courts and the tremendous increase in litiga-
tion, the village population is said to prefer informal settlement, finding it
"morally and socially desirable." The people favor "out-of-court com-
promise rather than [a] 'fight to the finish.' "27 "The merit of compro-
mise is always supposed to lie in 'avoidance of any further bickerings and
loss of money and time.' "28 "[I]t is not culturally 'natural' for an Indian
to turn at once to lawyer's law for redress of grievance. It is either the
last or an inescapable resort."
'29
Interestingly, when comparing British-style law with "indigenous"
law, "indigenous" is most often defined as Hindu customary law,
although Hindu customary law may not have ever been practiced by the
"indigenous" people. R.S. Khare explains that: "[A]lthough even Hindu
25. Id. 105-06.
26. Cohn, supra note 21, at 91.
27. Khare, supra note 23, at 80.
28. Id. at 81.
29. Id. at 85.
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Customary Law.. ., as codified and accepted by the British law courts,
may not be truly indicative of how social groups actually regulate their
social relations and punish the deviant, it remains the nearest consistent
version which can be compared with lawyer's law."3 0
The gap between this foreign legal system and the values, beliefs,
and methods of dispute resolution of the native population was a major
impediment to the state's ability to promote the liberating rights and
freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution. "The state legal system, con-
spicuously present in urban areas, is only slenderly present in rural areas.
The low visibility of the state legal system renders state law (its values
and processes) inaccessible and even irrelevant for people."
31
Four types of non-state legal systems continued to operate in-
dependent of the official state systems, which included both judicial
courts and N.P.s. The non-state legal systems are caste, community, tri-
bal-based panchayats, and private "reformist," non-state legal systems
operating under the impetus of a local leader. Generally, these non-state
systems epitomized the contrast with the formal legal system:
While the state law strives to attain justice interpartes through 'impar-
tial' judges and elaborate procedures for ascertaining 'truth,' indige-
nous dispute resolving institutions promote justice with notorious
informality through village or caste notables who know the disputants
personally. The adversary systems... of the state law seeks to individ-
ualize justice; village law and justice seek collectivized justice. Village
law and justice seek social group harmony through consensus, where
both sides engage in give and take whereas state law, followed to its
end, rests on 'winner-take-it-all' principle.
32
As long as recourse continued to be made to non-state institutions
for the resolution of local disputes, the values and norms the state wished
to advance were undercut.
The persistence of some non-state dispute institutions... sets some
real limits to directed social changes along the lines of the constitution-
ally desired social order. This would certainly be the case where these
systems derive legitimation from belief-systems which are not congru-
ent with those investing state legal systems with legitimacy.
33
The constitutionally desired... social order seeks to foster... equality
30. IMJ at 83.
31. Upendra Baxi, From Takrar to Karar The Lok Adalat at Rangpur-A Preliminary
Study, 10 J. CONST. & PARLIAMENTARY STUD. 52, 94 (1976).
32. UPENDRA BAXI, THE CRISIS OF THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSrM 337 (1982) [hereinafter
THE CRISIS OF THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM].
33. Baxi, supra note 31, at 95.
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whereas the Hindu caste system is based on... the principles of hier-
archy, religiously and 'culturally' sanctified and legitimated ...
Adoption of constitutional values naturally calls for sacrifices of per-
sonal or group interests, which are clearly not acceptable to those in
position of higher class, status or power.
34
The state could realize the social and economic equality envisioned in the
Constitution by promoting both legal aid and strategic public interest
litigation, and by creating forums more similar to traditional dispute res-
olution forums. It could thereby work to shatter the oppressive hierar-
chies dominating village life. The reforms would "indigenize" the official
judicial system, while revolutionizing and liberating the countryside.
Finally, the push for legal aid and expanded experimentation with
alternative methods for dispute resolution grew out of a shared aware-
ness that the Indian legal system was in crisis.35 Scholars reported a seri-
ous threat to the legitimacy of the state's legal authority. They argued
that the legal system was ineffective, and useless to the majority of the
population; the extremely crowded and slow-moving dockets frustrated
any of its possible benefits. Alternative forums that could reach and ap-
peal to the village population would bolster the state's legitimacy by eas-
ing the mounting tensions caused by the "litigation explosion" and by
substituting the state's own norms and values for those of the non-state
legal systems.
Following still other committee reports, in 1976 legal aid was made
a Constitutional Directive in Article 39A, entitled "Equal Justice and
Free Legal Aid:"
The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes
justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, pro-
vide free legal aid by suitable legislation or scheme or in any other way,
to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any
citizens by reasons of economic or other disabilities. 6
In 1978 Assam became the first state to establish the constitutionally
mandated legal aid scheme. Other states soon followed.
The national and state committee reports culminated in 1978 with
the Government of India report on legal aid entitled "National Juridi-
care: Equal Justice - Social Justice." The Report advocated a new philos-
ophy of legal aid that would not only encompass the provision of
34. THE CRISIS OF THE INDIAN LEGAL SYsTEM, supra note 32, at 339-43.
35. There was no shortage of doomsayers among scholars and the judiciary. Negative
forecasts can be found in almost any piece of writing on the Indian legal system. For a particu-
larly alarming report see id. at 32.
36. GOV'T OF MADHYA PRADESH, supra note 4, at 17.
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traditional legal services, like free legal aid and advice, but would aim to
eradicate poverty by creating access to the legal system. 37 The Report
declared:
As the removal of poverty depends upon radical transformation of the
present socio-economic structure, the legal services programme should
aim at ... elimination of all those unjust institutions which generate
and perpetuate poverty and the creation of a new socio-economic order
based upon liberty, equality and dignity of man. 
3
The Committee presented a draft of the National Legal Services Bill,
which established an infrastructure and purpose for the Legal Services
Programme. As in Justice Iyer's report, the Committee proposed exten-
sive use of N.P.s and "Lok Nyayalayas/Adalats" as a way to promote
conciliation.
Because the Government "found the steps taken by States too inade-
quate to meet what was recommended by the National Juridicare Re-
port,"3 9 the Committee for Implementing Legal Aid Schemes (CILAS)
was established in 1980, under the chairmanship of then Supreme Court
Judge Bhagwati, to organize, finance, and monitor legal aid schemes
throughout the country, and to advise the Government on further steps
to be taken to institutionalize the program.
The Committee has been set up... for the purpose of formulating and
implementing comprehensive legal aid schemes in different parts of the
country on a uniform basis, monitoring such schemes in different parts
of the country on a uniform basis.... with a view to ensuring their
effective functioning as a means to secure social justice.
40
The Committee would set up in each state and union territory a distinct
and independent Legal Aid and Advice Board with Legal Aid Commit-
tees at different levels, for the purpose of giving legal advice and aid to
the poor. "The composition of the Legal Aid and Advice Board and the
Legal Aid Committees will depend to some extent on factors and consid-
erations which may vary from State to State but the broad model would
be settled and decided upon by the Committee."4
At its inception, CILAS was intended to serve, more than anything
else, the preventive and strategic ends of the legal aid program that Jus-
tices Bhagwati and Iyer envisioned. Justice Bhagwati often expressed his
37. Menon, supra note 11, at 352.
38. Id
39. Id at 366.
40. 1 CENTER FOR IMPLEMENTING LEGAL AID SCHEMES NEWSL., Sep. 1981-Mar. 1982,
pts. 3, 4, at 2 [hereinafter CILAS NEwsL.].
41. 1 CILAS NEWSL, May 1981, at 12.
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designs for the national legal aid program in the CILAS newsletter,
which was originally intended to be a bimonthly:
The legal aid programme envisaged by the Committee is not merely a
court-oriented programme confined to giving legal aid to those who
need legal assistance for litigation .... [Tihe Committee believes that
the traditional legal aid programme which is purely litigation-oriented
cannot meet the specific needs of the poor in the country.
42
The strategic arm of CILAS would work to coordinate the efforts of
private voluntary organizations pursuing public interest litigation. The
preventive arm would educate and empower disadvantaged sectors of so-
ciety about their legal rights and prevent litigation by emphasizing con-
ciliation through the efforts of paralegals and social workers.
As a national legal aid coordinating body, CILAS was designed to
function as a service organization and to shape a particular vision of so-
cial and legal reform. Its creation was influenced by the efforts of the
Ford Foundation, which by the late 1970s had invested a great deal of
money and research in promoting activist legal aid programs.
It was felt that the disadvantaged could only find turnaround solutions
in the Indian legal system if they acquired the right kind of institu-
tional skills. Proposals were made to set up a central information
agency and support groups which would service all kinds of activists
groups. The proposals have been accompanied by the funding of some
activist groups. The new gift... is about 'fighting for rights' on the
basis of an American prototype as adapted to India.
43
CILAS proposed an ambitious program both for itself and for the
state legal aid programs. Both CILAS and the state local aid programs
would perform a wide range of services, with emphasis on delivering
grass-roots legal education. CILAS' functions would include:
1. Creating a directory of state Legal Aid Institutions, including infor-
mation on the services offered and sources of funding, and state welfare
legislation and welfare administration departments.
2. Preparing Legal Aid Manuals which would identify categories (wo-
men, children, tribals, scheduled castes, and unorganized labor) of people
to be targeted for legal assistance, recommending strategies for dispens-
ing legal services.
3. Organizing "Legal Aid lessons" in general education and profes-
42. Id. at 2.
43. Rajeev Dhavan, Borrowed Ideas: On the Impact of American Scholarship on Indian
Law, in THE TRAFFIC OF IDEAS BETWEEN INDIA AND AMERICA, supra note 17, at 308-09.
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sional training, including legal literacy for high school students, govern-
ment officials, and social workers.
4. Publishing a legal aid newsletter in all languages, in addition to the
bimonthly newsletter.
5. Training paralegals who would be employed to run the various
legal aid programs, including legal literacy camps and conciliation
centers.
6. Incorporating a "Legal Aid Cell" in the Planning Commission and
Law Ministry, to better coordinate the policies of CILAS with these two
government branches.
7. Promoting clinical legal education in law schools by involving law
students in the various legal aid programs.
8. Involving the legal profession by encouraging volunteer services in
the administration of legal aid.
9. Organizing "Legal Aid Camps" that would administer "door step
legal services" and educate the local population about their legal rights.
10. Establishing a "National College for Judicial Officers" to promote
research on poverty law and to inculcate a new judiciary with the
"proper social justice perspective."
11. Promoting "Community Mobilization and Rights Enforcement"
through public interest litigation."
Legal aid schemes based loosely on the CILAS model were insti-
tuted in fourteen states and union territories: Madhya Pradesh, Bihar,
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Orissa
Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Pondicherry, and
Tamil Nadu. Kerala and West Bengal adopted legal aid programs differ-
ent from the CILAS model.45
Although these states spoke of plans to implement the various stra-
tegic and preventive aspects of CILAS' scheme, most focused their ef-
forts on providing funds for free legal assistance to those whose incomes
fell below a certain amount. In addition, sporadic efforts were made to
organize legal literacy camps. Prompted by the goal of providing justice
without lawyers, various states recruited law students for participation in
these camps, while others held paralegal training sessions to staff legal
aid offices.
By the middle of 1983, CILAS provided grants for legal aid camps,
clinics, and legal literacy programs, paralegal training, public interest liti-
44. LegalAiL' Plan, Policies and Programmes, 1 CILAS NEWSL, May 1981, pt. 1, at 12-
18.
45. Menon, supra note 11, at 369.
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gation organizations, and rural/urban entitlement centers. The idea of
establishing informal conciliation courts (which later became L.A.
courts) as part of the national legal aid scheme did not arise until much
later.
At first, states independently experimented with L.A. courts and
similar reconciliation procedures. A small number of states had already
instituted "Motor Vehicle Accidents Claim Tribunals" as forums where
injured parties and insurance companies could reach quick settlements.
46
Some states attempted direct conciliation at the legal aid camps.47 A few
trials with mobile courts in Chindwara were made up of judges and of-
ficers of the Court of the District Magistrate, where a collector executed
orders and decisions, mostly in revenue cases. The courts were known
for "shedding off their rigidity, formalities, unapproachability, and com-
ing down to the people." However, they were not well received among
legal aid staff and the village population.48
Gujarat was the first state to formally call its experiment a "lok
adalat;" it established the first L.A. court in 1982, which was inaugu-
rated by then Supreme Court Judge Desai. 49 Gujarat had long been a
leader among states in the legal aid movement; it had first introduced a
legal aid scheme project in 1972 based on Bhagwati's famous Gujarat
Committee report, and had extended the project to the entire state by
1976.50
Gujarat's L.A. court experiment was first mentioned in the May-
August 1982 edition of the CILAS newsletter, in an article entitled The
Legal Aid Ambulance (Lok Adalat) Scheme in Gujarat.5 1 The scheme is
described as consisting of a team of "women lawyers, women social
workers, social workers, a couple of socially aware members of the Bar
with appropriate orientation and a number of retired judges and sitting
judges informed with a spirit of service and adept in bringing about rap-
prochement between parties by appropriate guidance and persuasion.
'52
The Legal Aid Ambulance worked out of a van, visiting preselected
towns. It gave free legal advice and thereby attracted potential litigants;
it then tried to persuade parties involved in a village dispute to reach a
quick settlement. The CILAS article describes a typical hearing:
46. CILAS NEWSL., May-Aug. 1982, at 8.
47. CILAS NEWSL., May-Aug. 1983, at 22.
48. Id. at 15-16.
49. Shiraz Sidhva, Lok Adalats: Quick, Informal Nyaya, LEx ET JURis 38 (1986).
50. CILAS NEWSL., Aug. 1986, at 2.
51. CILAS NEWSL., May-Aug. 1982, at 2.
52. Id. at 4.
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After listening to both the sides for a couple of minutes, they suggest a
formula for a just settlement. By a little persuasion a compromise
formula is evolved by making a commonsense approach which aims at
a practicable solution which puts an end to the dispute with little give
and take on both the sides.
53
Gujarat was the first state to attempt this type of proceeding; it had
already been the site of a well-documented and studied private experi-
ment with informal dispute resolution, also called a lok adalat, at an
Ashram in Rangpur." The lok adalat at Rangpur had evolved silently,
mainly through the initiative of the Ashram's founder, Harivallabh
Parikh. It functioned literally as a people's court, where Harivallabh and
representatives of the disputants would render a decision subject to the
local assembly's approval.55 It heard mainly intra-village disputes and
had managed to take over many of the functions of the localpanchayat.
56
Yet the lok adalat at the Rangpur Ashram was not the ideal model
of institutionalized informalism. Indeed, its vitality evidently revolved
around the community's acceptance of Harivallabh's leadership of the
Ashram. Harivallabh "began to be called.. .Prabhu (God),"5 7 and actu-
ally decided most of the cases that came to the lok adalat alone.
It may be hypothesized that even unto this day people bring their dis-
putes to Rangpur because of Bhai [Harivallabh], rather than because
of the lok adalat... .to the extent it is proved correct, the lok adalat
cannot be said to have been 'institutionalized.' [Tihe dedication, cha-
risma, and the indefatigable work by Harivallabh have made it gener-
ally a single personality oriented institution."
Interestingly, the study, which emphasized Rangpur's lok adalat
existence as a non-state legal institution, reveals that the lok adalat relied
on popular dislike for the official courts as incentive to appear before it.
A summons to appear would read, "you surely know... that expensive
and frequent visits to law courts are not in the interests of us poor
farmers.
59
The Rangpur experiment appears to have been a model for Guja-
rat's experimentation with L.A. courts. The Ashram's success perhaps
53. Id
54. Upendra Baxi had written on the Lok Adalat in Rangpur as a study on non-state
institutions for dispute resolution. See THE CRISIS OF THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra
note 31.
55. Id at 61-64.
56. Id at 62-63.
57. Id at 59.
58. Id at 62, 91.
59. Id at 84.
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encouraged hopes that the state could also establish such popular infor-
mal forums for dispute resolution.
News of the success of the lok adalat at Rangpur spread through the
CILAS Newsletter. Soon after reports came in of Gujarat's successful
experiments with L.A. courts, other states began holding their own L.A.
courts in conjunction with legal aid camps with great fanfare and public-
ity. Rajasthan was the first to follow Gujarat, and soon became a leader
in the L.A. movement. In 1984 Maharashtra introduced lok nyayalayas,
another name for L.A. courts, also patterned after the Gujarat model.
Kerala reported holding its first two-day L.A. court "styled by its origi-
nator Justice Krishna Iyer," and attended by several High Court judges,
the media, and important members of the bar.6'
It is unclear when CILAS first took notice of the L.A. courts and
decided to implement and endorse the informal courts as a part of the
national legal aid strategy, because CILAS published only one newsletter
between November 1984 and August 1986. That issue introduced L.A.
courts as a new feature of legal aid, "that will henceforth become a per-
manent feature of the Newsletter,, 61 and proposed guidelines "till such
time these Lok Adalats receive a statutory base.",
62
At the Third Meeting of the State Law Ministers and Executive
Chairmen of the State Legal Aid and Advice Boards in June of 1986,
guidelines for the L.A. courts were first established. The guidelines fo-
cused primarily on who would be allowed to hold and administer L.A.
courts. Noting the growing popularity of these "innovative forms of
legal aid camps,... [that are] an alternative forum for dispute resolu-
tion," CILAS "decided that the Lok Adalats be monitored and overseen
by the State Legal Aid and Advice Boards." CILAS agreed to allow
"voluntary organizations and social action groups" to hold their own
L.A. courts "if they have been given financial assistance and/or spon-
sored by the CILAS or State Legal Aid Board."63
The guidelines reflected a desire to bring the L.A. courts under ad-
ministrative and procedural control, but were cautious about the effect of
that control on the informality and flexibility of the courts. They recom-
mended that judges for the L.A. courts be "drawn from retired judges,
public spirited lawyers and law teachers, selected on the basis of their
reputation in the community, professional integrity and aptitude for so-
cial work," and be trained with the "object and methods" of the L.A.
60. CILAS NEWSL., May-Aug. 1984, at 5.
61. CILAS NEWSL., Nov. 1984-Aug. 1986, at 1.




courts." They offered procedures to "provide some degree of uniformity
in approach and methods," for notice, preparation, and coordination
with local courts.65 Additionally, an "orientation programme in which
lawyers with legal aid and Lok Adalat experience may speak with refer-
ence to the law applicable" was proposed, with the proviso that "it
should be remembered that Lok Adalats are not intended to replace the
existing adjudicatory system through courts but to supplement it by pro-
viding an alternate cheap and expeditious forum for litigants to get their
legitimate due."66
Finally, the guidelines hinted at greater regulation in the future:
It may be necessary to give this programme... statutory authority to
summon parties, witnesses and documents. Involvement of the judici-
ary, the profession and the Government may be attempted at. The du-
ties, qualifications for the conciliators (judges), lawyers, retired judges
or law teachers .. may be prescribed. A code of conduct may be
evolved to maintain the professional integrity and privileged
communications. 67
The 1986 meeting closed with a call that the movement be "imple-
mented with greater vigor in several states," requesting state legal aid
boards to "concentrate on holding Lok Adalats,... at least one... per
week in different parts of the state .... 6
The introduction of L.A. courts as a formal part of the national
legal aid program coincided with key shifts in CILAS' administration.
In August 1986 Justice R.N. Misra took over as CILAS' Executive
Chairman, and Bhagwati, who had been promoted to Chief Justice,
stepped aside to hold the newly created position of Patron-in-Chief. By
May 1987 Bhagwati resigned from CILAS entirely, and Justice Pathak,
who replaced Bhagwati as Chief Justice, became the new Patron-in-
Chief.
With this shift in administration in late 1986 came a substantial
change in the orientation of the legal aid program. Specifically, the L.A.
court movement, as a state-administered program of informal dispute
resolution, became the primary focus of the legal aid program. While
Bhagwati headed the legal aid program, he had emphasized the need to
use poverty law to transform the socio-economic status of the poor and
64. Id at 38-40.
65. Id
66. Id at 40.
67. Id
68. I d at 8.
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oppressed, and had advocated expansive legal literacy, group legal ac-
tion, and public interest litigation campaigns.
Under Misra's leadership, however, the emphasis shifted to promot-
ing alternative and appropriate legal forums to better meet the true needs
of the population. A call for quick, informal, and traditional dispute res-
olution for the rural and urban poor replaced the call for strategic and
preventive justice programs. "The weaker sections of society do not have
the staying power which the affluent and the well-to-do possess. Speedier
avenues of justice must be found for them and there must be greater
opportunity for resorting to them," wrote Misra. "[The] Lok Adalat
[movement] is a welcome innovation in that direction. [I]t operates on
the principle that a settlement or compromise is to be preferred between
the parties. There are no winners and no losers.... Nor does any ques-
tion arise of prolonging the litigation by recourse to appeal or revision."
69
The arguments in support of the L.A. courts echoed many of the
sentiments commonly heard in the debates over the Indian legal system.
L.A. courts were promoted as as an "extension of this age-old form of
justice," where "disputes were settled with the aid of a mediator, who
trie[s] to reconcile two parties, who in turn had to be prepared for com-
promise,"7 and thus more natural forums for dispute resolution. Unlike
the official courts where artifice and formality reign, the L.A. court
"seeks to resolve legal disputes between parties, by negotiation, concilia-
tion and by adopting a persuasive, commonsensical and humane ap-
proach to their problems, with the assistance of a specially-oriented and
experienced team of conciliators."71 Furthermore, by promoting concili-
ation, the L.A. courts could fulfill constitutional and legal mandates urg-
ing "mutual settlement of disputes, . . . preferable to long-drawn out
litigation."72
In a decidedly paternalistic turn, CILAS and other promoters ar-
gued that the L.A. courts better served the interests of the poor than the
formal courts. Indeed, the advocates of L.A. groups argued that "it is
the only alternative.""
It is not that poor people deserve only 'second-class' justice or courts
have very little use for them. On the contrary, given the cost, delay
and uncertainty of the judicial process, litigation fo solving every
problem of the poor might result in aggravating their sufferings while
69. CILAS NEWSL., May-Aug. 1987, at 1.
70. Sidhva, supra note 49, at 38.
71. Id.
72. Id
73. Id. at 39.
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denying them the benefits through unending legal battles.
74
The benefit to the state would include not only the expenses saved from
litigation kept out of the costly judicial system, but also a more pleasant
polity.
75
Between 1986 and 1988, the L.A. court movement was promoted on
an unprecedented scale. States reported holding L.A. courts with greater
and greater frequency, and tallied astounding numbers of conciliated
cases. 76 By August of 1987 Justice Misra reported that "about 1500 lok
adalats have so far been held all over the country in which over 860,000
74. CILAS NEWSL, Nov. 1983-Dec. 1984, at 10.
75. Justice Misra explained that:
Besides the truncated budget, and unnecessary expenditure entailed in moving the
courts, public time is saved, and bitterness and tension in the life of the litigant, and
on a larger scale, in society, is no more there, which leaves scope for better personal-
ity growth, and eventually, appropriate citizenship development.
Sidhva, supra note 49, at 39.
In an inaugural address held at the seventh Lok Adalat held in Delhi, Chief Justice
Pathak voiced his own support for L.A. courts:
There are areas of litigation and categories of cases which lend themselves readily to
simpler procedures than those we have been accustomed to. The need to recognize
their relevance has become increasingly greater with the overwhelming accumulation
of pending cases.... [W]e must turn to innovative techniques, and within recogniza-
ble limits adopt changes of orientation .... there can be no objection to this so long as
the basic principles of the Rule of Law are observed and true justice can be ensured.
CILAS NEwsL May-Aug. 1987, at 3.
Pathak appeared cautious about the unmonitored and procedureless use of these informal
courts, however:
So long as the two cardinal features of judicial proceeding are guaranteed, that is to
say, firstly, ensuring an awareness in the litigant of his rights and obligations, and
secondly, promoting a settlement reached through the free and willing consent of the
parties, we have a system which should receive the approval of all concerned with
procedures of dispute settlement.
Id.
76. For example, unverified figures reported to CILAS on Lok Adalat courts held and
cases settled show the following:
Number of




Gujarat 176 21,025 (1985-87)
Haryana 91 36,019




Uttar Pradesh 247 149,312
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cases have been settled."177 The number of cases reported settled at a
single L.A. session ranges between 169 cases to an unbelievable 2,543
cases. 78 The averaged numbers of cases may have been affected by count-
ing settlements individually where an extremely large number of plain-
tiffs sued, such as a class suffering an industrial injury.79 The sometimes
inconsistent state reports make the figures unreliable.
State legal aid boards were given great incentive to promote L.A.
courts, despite the resistance of local judges and bar councils. Although
states were required to fund their own state legal aid boards, CILAS
granted special federal funds for the promotion of the L.A. courts. Addi-
tionally, members of the state courts and bars quickly perceived the polit-
ical advantages to be gained by supporting a movement that was
primarily the design of Supreme Court Justices. Bhagwati, Pathak, and
Misra would visit state legal aid programs personally. Eventually the
promotion of the lok adalats became a political necessity.80
L.A. courts also provided an opportunity for local politicians to
gather support and to voice their opinions on this popular new develop-
ment. In Bihar, for example, top dignitaries, including the Chief Justice
of the High Court, other high court justices, and the Union Minister of
Law and Justice made a conspicuous appearance at the first L.A. court.
The event appears to have been more a formal gathering of political elite,
where "in their respective addresses, [the speakers] apprised the audi-
ence, including the lawyers, litigants and the elites of the town, of the
importance of Lok Adalat, [and] its purpose in bringing mutual trust and
cooperation among the people of the society."' 8 The Central Govern-
ment made a large effort to promote L.A. courts in regions where they
had still not been organized by state boards by 1987. The northeastern
region was referred to frequently as an area where L.A. courts were
needed but had not yet been held. In some areas, the Central Legal Au-
77. CILAS NEWSL. May-Aug. 1987, at 2.
78. Gujarat reported 19,353 cases settled at 114 L.A. courts (average:169) between No-
vember 1985 and August 1986. See CILAS NEWSL. Nov. 1985 - Aug. 1986; Rajasthan re-
ported settling 94,102 cases at 37 L.A. courts held between December 1985 and May 1986
(average: 2543). Sidhva, supra note 49, at 38.
79. For example, Andhra Pradesh reported settling the suit of 22,000 mass claimants in a
suit for land lost to the government when it acquired a steel plant. Madhya Pradesh similarly
gave notice of a L.A. ready to settle over 30,000 compensation claims "in respect of lands
acquired for Visakhapatnam Steel Plant." CILAS NEWSL., Feb. 1988, at 17.
80. The state of Haryana put it bluntly: "People feel elated that the Judges of the Supreme
Court, High court and the members of lower judiciary come to their villages." CILAS
NEWSL., Aug. 1988, at 4.
81. Id. at 2.
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thority would set up the L.A. court camp itself.8 2
In certain instances, however, CILAS would concede to local au-
thorities who resisted the L.A. courts. In Arunachal Pradesh, for exam-
ple, CILAS described the "system of dispensation of justice by the
Village/Tribal Councils" as one "which has been in existence from time
immemorial," and operated in a "predominantly tribal population;"' 3 it
thereby suggested that L.A. innovation was not always needed." In
1985, at a Joint Conference of Chief Justices of High Courts, Chief Min-
isters and Law Ministers of the States, the attendees gave unanimous
approval to establishing L.A. courts, but made an exception for the
northeastern states, "where different conditions prevail."85
Nevertheless, the general success of the L.A. courts continued. The
November 1987-May 1988 edition of the CILAS Newsletter opened with
a statement by Justice Pathak filled with praise for the movement, the
tremendous strides it had made, and the respect it had garnered from
academics and lawyers.8 6 By August 1988, L.A. courts were promoted
as a project separate from legal aid. The CILAS Newsletter described its
legal aid program as the "Legal Aid and Advice System and the Lok
Adalat movement."8"
The procedures of the L.A. courts played a part in their early suc-
cess. Hearings at L.A. courts are described as idyllic, harmonious "para-
judicial" events where parties reach mutually satisfactory settlements in
extremely brief periods of time (sometimes within minutes) with the help
of a gentle conciliator. State legal aid boards offer potential plaintiffs
who approach them for legal advice (usually at a legal aid camp), the
option of first appearing before a L.A. court. Sometimes, lower district
courts offer parties who have already filed formal suits, particularly in
divorce or maintenance cases, the option to transfer to a L.A. court in
order to attempt a conciliated settlement. A hearing is thus said to pro-
ceed only on the full desire and consent of the parties.88
82. As it did in Assam in 1987. CILAS NEWSL, Feb. 1988, at 15.
83. CILAS NEwsL-, Aug. 1988, at 2.
84. rd
85. Id
86. CILAS NEWSL, Nov. 1987 - May 1988, at 1.
87. CILAS NEWSL, Aug. 1988, at 1.
88. Lok Adalat is in the nature of an impromptu court presided over by respectable citi-
zens of a locality assisted by a lawyer to hear disputes voluntarily taken before it by the parties
and to give fair settlements according to legal rights and obligations. The approach is infor-
mal, conciliatory and confidence-gathering. Though there is no legal sanctions as such in the
settlement reached, parties tend to abide by it. Menon, supra note 11, at 344.
When a particular matter is called up for hearing, either the petitioner or the lawyer
representing him can explain his problem. The case is discussed informally, and the
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Initially, L.A. courts had no jurisdictional limitation; all kinds of
cases were heard. Some states passed rules and procedures limiting their
jurisdiction to particular kinds of issues, typically involving disputes over
land, matrimonial status, inheritance, succession, and guardianship. Ad-
ditionally, the L.A. courts addressed minor criminal cases, motor vehicle
accident compensation cases, industrial and labor disputes, and small
civil suits.
Motor vehicle accident claims were the most prevalent cases in the
L.A. courts, proving popular with both claimants and insurance compa-
nies; the L.A. courts provided the ideal forum for haggling over the
amount of compensation, the only issue in dispute. An injured party
could collect her compensation almost immediately, which was signifi-
cantly shorter than the time required to receive compensation in a formal
court. "The local branch of a nationalised bank is requested to open a
counter at the site of the lok adalat so that money distributed is advanced
on the spot, in the form of bank drafts."89
Notably absent before L.A. courts are commercial litigants. Given
the quick settlement advantages of L.A. courts, one would expect the
business sector to have made full use of the forums. One would also
expect private parties with claims against insurance companies to have
voluntarily taken their cases to L.A. courts.
Unfortunately, neither private nor business litigants presented their
cases to L.A. courts. The promotion of L.A. courts primarily at legal aid
camps or for matters involving family disputes may partially explain
their absence. Additionally, such parties may simply not have had access
to the L.A. courts.90
mediators can intervene at any point in the proceedings, as can the opposite party.
Issues are clarified, and it is aimed to arrive at a fair settlement. [The judge's] task is
merely to clarify the law, and by methods of persuasion, make each party realize how
he stands to benefit from a particular settlement arrived at. On some occasions, the
compensation amount is made available to the parties on the same day, thereby mak-
ing the lok adalats popular. Sidhva, supra note 49, at 40-41.
[I]t is not ... an exhibition of organized power of a state agency or a Panchayat
under a village chieftain. It is an amorphous crowd of concerned citizens animated
by a common desire for justice and willing to experiment with consensual models of
dispute resolution in the interests of themselves as well as the rest of society. Id. at
39.
89. Id. at 40.
90. Tamil Nadu's experience with private, non-legal-aid litigants, however, raises ques-
tions about this explanation:
At a conference with the Adalat members, it was decided that if the Insurance Indus-
try cooperate, there could be a preliminary discussion of the cases, before the Secre-
tary of the Board with the lawyers for the claimants and Insurance lawyers. The
insurance lawyers cooperated and the quantum was discussed and the differences
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Because of the ease and speed with which compensation disputes
were being settled, litigants who did use the courts made demands for
specialized L.A. courts. For example, state boards created L.A. courts
that dealt exclusively with motor vehicle compensation claims.91 Despite
the existence of specialized formal tribunals, plaintiffs increasingly
turned to L.A. courts designed exclusively for compensation.9
The procedure for settling compensation amounts began to resemble
American style settlement negotiations between attorneys, which was an
uncommon practice in India. Tamil Nadu's Legal Aid Board en-
couraged such negotiations:
[The L.A. courts should] comprise cases where no elaborate legal is-
sues are required to be settled, but only the quantum has to be set-
fled.... The preliminary stage of preparation for the adalat should
provide an opportunity for a prior discussion between the parties as-
sisted by their lawyers and the representatives of the Insurance compa-
nies. At this discussion, an estimate for the quantum should be arrived
at by consensus. Only where there is difference, it will be left for the
adalat's decision.
93
As the popularity of the L.A. courts peaked, commentators urged
that the courts be vested with statutory authority in order to better for-
malize their proceedings. Although such authority would promote rec-
ognition of the L.A. courts, it could also undermine their informality,
flexibility, and voluntary nature. Nevertheless, CILAS and the state
legal aid boards urged the national government to act:
It is felt by state governments that some sort of statutory authority,
including the power to summon witnesses and documents would con-
siderably help the scheme, giving it more teeth. Suitable amendments
to the Criminal Procedure Code and Civil Procedure Code, and the
Arbitration Act,... whereby courts are given the discretion to refer
narrowed down, and in most of the cases, agreements were tentatively reached. This
was however possible only in Legal Aid Board's cases... The lawyers in the private
cases did not cooperate in the discussion and elected for discussion with the insur-
ance lawyers themselves.
In non-assisted cases, only parties in eleven cases out of a total of about one hundred
appeared before the adalat. Later on .... hundreds of cases, (non.assisted) in which
lawyers held parleys with the insurance lawyers, were settled before the regular tribu-
nals. The Board has had no control over these award monies.
CILAS NEWSL, Aug. 1988, at 21.
91. Sidvha, supra note 49, at 39.
92. For example, Rajasthan established exclusive pension lok adalats.
93. CILAS NEWSL., Aug. 1988, at 21. Members of the bar originally objected to the use
of LA. courts, because the L.A. courts decreased attorneys fees traditionally earned by charg-
ing for each appearance in prolonged bouts of litigation.
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any or all disputes to alternate bodies for compulsory conciliation or
arbitration, would help .... 94
In 1987, in response to demands for some sort of legislation on legal
aid and L.A. courts, Parliament passed the National Legal Services Au-
thorities Act (the Legal Services Act), which authorized the central,
state, and district level governments to establish Legal Services Authori-
ties and conferred statutory status to the L.A. courts."s Most of the pro-
visions of the Legal Services Act were implemented while it was pending
as a bill.
The Legal Services Act mandated the Supreme Court's permanent
participation in the National Legal Services Authority, ordered the Chief
Justice of India to serve as its Patron-in-Chief, and a serving or retired
Judge of the Supreme Court to serve as Executive Chairman. 96 It further
ordered the Government to fund the Central Authority in order to estab-
lish a National Legal Aid Fund, which would be used to provide grants
to State Legal Aid Boards.97
The Legal Services Act provided statutory recognition for the L.A.
courts, allowing state or district authorities to organize the courts as they
saw fit.98 It also gave L.A. courts the jurisdiction to "determine and
arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in
respect of any matter falling within the jurisdiction of any civil, criminal,
or revenue court or any tribunal constituted under any law for the time
being in force in the area for which the Lok Adalat is organized." 99
Procedurally, the Legal Services Act provided that pending cases be
transferred to L.A. courts by direct application of the parties either to
the District Authority or to the judge in whose court the case was pend-
ing.1" If the parties could not reach a compromise or settlement, they
could reinitiate litigation "from the stage at which it was before the suit
or proceeding was transferred to the Lok Adalat."1 1 The Act's only
procedural guideline required "utmost expedition to arrive at a compro-
mise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by legal prin-
ciples and the principles of justice, equity and fair play;" 102 every L.A.
94. Sidhva, supra note 49, at 38.
95. National Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (India).
96. CILAS NEWSL., Nov. 1987-Feb. 1988, at 4.
97. Id. However, national funding for state legal aid projects had long been provided
through CILAS.
98. CILAS NEWSL., Nov.1987-Feb. 1988, at 9.
99. d
100. Id at 10.
101. Id
102. Id at 9.
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court was to formulate its own procedure "for the determination of any
dispute."
' 10 3
L.A. courts were given the authority to issue awards "deemed to be
a decree of a civil court, or order of any other court or tribunal ....
More importantly, the Act provided that "every award made by a Lok
Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no
appeal shall lie to any court against the award." 5 This finality made
settlement before a L.A. court risky, given the speed with which parties
were urged to settle their disputes.
L.A. courts were also given the same powers as civil courts under
the Code of Civil Procedure, including the power to summon and enforce
attendance of witnesses, order discovery, receive evidence on affidavits,
and "such other matters as may be prescribed." Finally, most of the
1986 CILAS guidelines, including those requiring state administration of
the courts and limiting decision-making to state personnel, were reiter-
ated in the Legal Services Act.
Critics voiced opposition to the Legal Services Act, particularly to
its provisions for the L.A. courts. They felt that it defeated the spirit and
purpose of L.A. courts as informal, grass-roots courts that existed almost
apart from state authority, and pointed out that L.A. courts had evolved
naturally as a result of popular desire to resolve disputes through concili-
ation, without the intervention of official courts.
Justice Iyer, founder of the L.A. courts movement, became the most
vocal critic of the newly designed L.A. courts; he attacked the Legal
Services Act in his book, Legal Services Authorities Act - A Critique:
What is contemplated ... is another kind of Court with jurisdiction
and jurisprudence of its own.... A dilatory machinery, which can
hijack cases from the Courts in the name of cognisance by lok adalats
and a stay of proceedings, defeats the whole purpose of speedy jus-
tice.... [They are] clumsy imitations of Courts, not social mobiliza-
tion schemes.... [A]nother strange, futile court is offered... !16
Iyer disapproved of the Act's insistence that Judicial officers and lawyers
have primary responsibility for the L.A. courts, and that decisions be
made according to principles of common law.
In many places, Lok Adalats are transfigured as People's Festivals of
Justice. The participants are not merely judicial officers or lawyers...
103. Id
104. Id at 10.
105. Id
106. IYER, supra note 19, at 47.
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or justice, equality, and fair play and the settlements are not necessar-
ily according to legal principles, but with an eye on social goals like
ending feuds, restoring family peace, and providing for distitutes, law
or no law. Social workers, welfare activists, village elders, and
respected intellectuals, apart from law persons, must be involved in
these melas
10 7
Finally, Iyer reproached the Legal Services Act for its "monopoliza-
tion" of the functions of an originally non-state legal institution:
It is disastrous to monopolise Lok Adalats by the state as the scheme of
the Statute proposes. When conciliations through Lok Adalats materi-
alize, the award so made is invested with the force of a decree. This
added value which facilitates execution and carries other advantages
attaches only to State-organized Lok Adalats. Voluntary bodies with
considerable credibility, creativity, and experience have been con-
ducting Lok Adalats in the past. To exclude such organizations merely
because they are not state-run is to defeat the broad objective of pro-
moting settlement of cases through voluntary bodies of stature and
standing.108
II. OBSERVATIONS FROM THE FIELD: THE
FUNCTIONING OF L.A. COURTS
Despite the passage of the Legal Services Act in 1987, reports and
observations indicate that L.A. courts have experienced a tremendous
decline since the end of 1987. Even Rajasthan, the leader of the L.A.
court movement, reported holding only seven sessions in 1987, in com-
parison to a peak of 154 sessions in 1986. Furthermore, L.A. courts con-
tinue to be used almost exclusively for motor vehicle compensation and
matrimonial cases.
Officials have not acknowledged this decline. Indeed, CILAS con-
tinues to speak of the L.A. movement as the novelty of the national legal
aid program. What explains this decline, despite the tremendous efforts
made to promote the courts as the most promising new development in
the Indian legal scene? An examination of four state legal aid programs
and a comparison of L.A. courts to their predecessor N.P.s provide some
answers.
A. Rajasthan
Rajasthan established its L.A. court program in November 1985,
107. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 96-97.
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soon after Gujarat presented reports of its own successful experiments.
Rajasthan was heralded as the leader of the L.A. movement; it held more
L.A. court sessions than any other state. Between the inception of the
program in November 1985 to July 1989, Rajasthan reported holding
252 L.A. courts which disposed of 345,154 cases, and averaged an as-
tounding 1,369 cases per camp. In contrast to other states' L.A. courts,
only a small number of these cases were Motor Accident Claims cases.
According to the Rajasthan Evaluation Committee's reports, settled
cases represented almost fifty-six percent of cases submitted to the L.A.
courts. Twenty-two percent of the settled cases involved disputes of
members of scheduled castes or tribes-the largest group of legal aid ben-
eficiaries. The majority of the cases involved land dispute and revenue
cases.
Unique among states, however, was Rajasthan's extensive use of
L.A. courts for criminal"°9 or state offense cases 1 ° under the Motor Ve-
hicle, Wireless, Municipal, and Police Acts. While their criminal juris-
diction encompassed all non-compoundable offenses (offenses with
limited sentences), they were forbidden from hearing "economic offenses
against the state, because the white collar criminals should not be al-
lowed to get [the] benefit of L.A. courts."'
1'
As a hybrid form of plea-bargaining, rewarding a quick confession
with a shortened sentence, the use of L.A. courts generated cost savings
for the state's prosecution and prison systems. However, the Evaluation
Committee recommended that such cases be "excluded... from the pur-
view of Lok Adalat, [because] these cases are not decided amicably by the
parties and the punishment is invariably awarded for the offense."" I2
Compensation cases, the favorites of the L.A. court program, had
comparatively little success in Rajasthan. Only 2178 motor accident
claims cases, 1875 labor cases, 318 matrimonial cases, and 456 mainte-
nance cases were settled. Many of the family law cases were handled
directly by the state Family Courts, which at one point were called Rec-
onciliation Courts. Rajasthan made efforts to promote use of the L.A.
courts in these matters, but was unable to entice parties to transfer their
cases to the L.A. courts. However, Rajasthan state legal aid officials and
judges repeatedly cited motor accident claims cases as the most success-
ful feature of L.A. courts.
109. Criminal cases make up 21% of L.A. court cases.
110. State offense cases make up 20% of L.A. court cases.
111. Interview with Mr. Nathawat, State Legal Aid Program Director (July 26, 1989).
112. EVALUATION ORGANIZATION, GOV'T OF RAJASTHA , WORKING OF Lox ADALATS
IN RAAsrHAN, Study No. 123, at 15 [hereinafter WORKING OF LOK ADALATS].
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Rajasthan used L.A. courts extensively as a means of transferring
pending litigation in smaller cases out of the local district courts. While
L.A. courts were never held on any fixed schedule, a date for each session
would be fixed eight to ten weeks in advance. The Legal Aid Committee
would select cases for referral to the upcoming session from a list of lo-
cally pending cases.
The Legal Aid Committee relied a great deal on the participation of
the local political administration and private voluntary organizations to
settle the selected cases even before they reached the L.A. court. Soon
after the list of selected cases was prepared, it would be distributed to
education institutions, local bodies including zila parishads, panchayat
samitis, social institutions, and... those interested in the working of
the lok adalat. As soon as lists are received by the various agencies
and through the motivation of the program they also act as concilia-
tors at the village level and try to settle the matter there.
1 3
Cases thus arrived at L.A. courts only if village officials or volunteer
organizations had not been able to persuade the parties to settle. Once in
the L.A. courts, judges from local courts would again attempt to per-
suade the parties to reconcile:
As soon as the matters are settled, the compromise is submitted to the
Court for verification and for passing the necessary orders. The cases
which cannot be settled at the village level are reflerred to the lok
adalat on the date of concluding session.., where motivation starts by
delivering talks . . . by honorable judges of the high court, district
judges, and some other persons.
1 14
Officers of the court would then review the settlements to insure none
were contrary to the law.
Participants readily acknowledged that the popularity of the L.A.
courts stemmed less from their intrinsic merit than from popular dissatis-
faction with the time and cost of litigating in regular courts."15 The
Evaluation Committee reported that a party's costs before a L.A. court
averaged 38 rupees, in contrast to the 955 rupees spent in litigation. 1
16
The state spent a remarkably low sum of 1.4 rupees per L.A. case. 117
While parties spent an average of 14.6 days before a court, a L.A. court
113. CILAS NEWSL., Nov. 1986, at 18. See also Nathawat, supra note I11.
114. Id.
115. Litigants were regularly told that "everyone will be a loser in court." Nathawat,
supra note 111.




decision took an average of 1.2 days."18
Participants in the L.A. courts also expressed satisfaction with the
popular features of the L.A. court system, including, for example,
"speedy justice," "promotion of mutual understanding," "conciliation,"
and "fraternity," all in contrast to the adversarial system of the official
courts. Furthermore, some argued that because most of the decisions
and settlements were arrived at before a village assembly, parties were
less likely to fabricate facts (reportedly a common feature at judicial
courts).
Lawyers had a different reaction. They originally resisted repre-
senting parties before the L.A. courts because such representation cut
into their fees. In India, fees are traditionally charged per court appear-
ance. In order to appease the lawyers, the state established fixed fees for
lawyers appearing before the L.A. courts (which amounted, in some
cases, to a percentage of the settled sum). A sample study conducted by
the Evaluation Committee reported that eighty-five percent of respon-
dents who had hired attorneys had paid the pre-agreed fee in full, even
though the case had been settled in the L.A. court.119
The Chairman of the state program noted the success of the L.A.
courts in facilitating the resolution of religious disputes and in providing
a forum for the peaceful arbitration of community quarrels that had
often led to violence in the past. In particular, he cited two case studies
carried out by the Rajasthan State Evaluation Organisation.
The first study involved a dispute between Sanatan Dharmis and
Jains in the town of Siwana, in the Barmer District of Rajasthan. The
dispute arose when the Dharmis cremated a monkey on land sold to the
Jain Community, and on which Jains performed their religious custom of
feeding pigeons. The Dharmis objected to the land sale and built a reli-
gious shrine on the site. Following the cremation, tensions between the
two communities increased, and local police intervened. After failed ne-
gotiations, the Dharmis first instituted a vegetable and dairy boycott
against the Jaims, and then filed a suit to prevent the destruction of the
shrine.
Nearby, a L.A. court camp chaired by three judges from the Rajas-
than High Court was being held. The judges took it upon themselves to
persuade the leaders of both communities to attempt to conciliate at the
L.A. court. (Interestingly, two of the judges were Jains and the third was
118. Id.
119. Id at 27.
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a Sanatan Dharmi.)2 °
The judges became extensively involved in the negotiations; they
"camped in the Dak Bungalow and refused to accept the hospitality till
an amicable solution of the problem was arrived." 2' Eventually, the
Jains agreed to allow the shrine to remain in return for another plot of
land where a platform for feeding pigeons would be built.
In this case, the L.A. court essentially performed functions normally
executed by the village panchayat. The "conciliation" seems to have
been more the result of the dedication and authority of the three judges
than of anything inherently unique in the structure of L.A. courts. In-
deed, the Committee conceded this:
[T]he endurance of the compromise will depend on the persons called
upon to play the reconeiliating mediators. They have to be respected
persons.... the efforts of compromise at the official level yielded no
results but the intervention by the three High Court Judges made all
the difference. 122
The second study featured a dispute between Muslims and Hindus
over a mosque in the town of Rajaldesar in the Churu District. Approxi-
mately seventy-five percent of the population were Hindu, and about ten
percent were Muslim. 123 The Muslims applied for permission from the
Municipal Board to build a second mosque on newly donated land, but
were denied permission. Subsequently, Hindus in the community pro-
tested that despite the Board's denial, religious services were being car-
ried out on the property. The Board referred the dispute to the court.
The conflict was resolved initially through negotiations; the Hindus
agreed to allow the Muslims to build the mosque as long as the Muslims
adhered to a number of restrictions, including a refrain from using loud-
speakers to call for prayers at the mosque. The settlement was entered as
a court judgement.
Six years later, however, the Muslims violated the agreement by in-
stalling a loudspeaker on one of the minarets of the mosque. The Hindus
responded by filing suit. Community leaders urged the parties to resolve
the dispute at a nearby L.A. court; within a short time, they reached a
new compromise limiting the use of the loudspeaker. Although the lead-
ers negotiated the dispute amongst themselves, they used the L.A. court
120. EVALUATION ORGANIZATION, GOV'T OF RAJASTHAN, ROLE OF LoK ADALATS IN
EASING OF COMMUNAL TANSION, Study No. 102, at 17.
121. Id. at 18.
122. Id. at 20.
123. Id at 21.
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forum, where three High Court judges gave "valuable assistance." 124
The Evaluation Committee credited the L.A. court with resolving
the conflict. As with the first case, however, the villagepanchayat could
have provided an identical forum for such negotiations. Again, the pres-
ence of judicial authority played the greatest role in facilitating the
solution.
While these cases demonstrate the value and advantage of a negoti-
ated settlement over a one-sided victory in an adversarial setting, it is not
clear that such settlements could not have been reached outside the L.A.
court context. Perhaps the traditional approach to litigation in India
precludes judicially supervised negotiations in court. Possibly, the vil-
lage panchayats have been ineffective in facilitating negotiations between
conflicting groups. The L.A. courts, however, do not necessarily create
this possibility, unless they include the extensive involvement of judges or
other respected community leaders.
The success of Rajasthan's L.A. courts apparently peaked in 1986.
While 154 L.A. court sessions were held in 1986, none were held from
January to August of 1987. Neither state evaluation reports or reports
submitted to the CILAS Newsletter offer a reason for this decline. By
1988, no L.A. courts were held.
In an interview, the Chairman of the State Legal Aid Board, Mr.
Nathawat, explained that part of the reason for the decline was a critical
shortage of staff.'25 Previously, judicial clerks had handled all the prepa-
rations necessary for referring a case to a L.A. court, and then reviewed
and recorded the settlements. The clerks began to complain about the
increased workload, and finally refused to handle L.A. court cases. The
Board, already understaffed, was overwhelmed by the responsibility of
organizing legal aid, legal literacy camps, and marital reconciliation
courts. They demanded that the L.A. courts provide their own clerks
and officers, but the government refused to provide the funding for the
additional staff.
Those involved with the L.A. courts also complained that their
work had no legal sanction. They argued for formalization of the L.A.
courts, and binding authority for L.A. settlements. Evidently, parties ig-
nored a large number of the settlement orders and refiled their cases in
the official courts. Despite the passage of the Legal Services Act and
state rules for the L.A. courts, the provisions granting L.A. courts statu-
124. Id. at 29.
125. Nathawat, supra note 111.
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tory authority had not been implemented. 126
B. Maharashtra
The chairman of the Maharashtra Legal Aid Board described pov-
erty and reconciliation as the two linchpins of their legal aid program:
"[U]nlike the United States where three hundred million dollars is given
away per year, we have to manage on a small budget .... Between
CILAS and the state funding, we receive forty lakhs per year. 't1 27
Legal aid applicants in Maharashtra are required to attempt recon-
ciliation before any legal assistance or even an appearance before a LA
court is provided. They must first appeal for aid from the Counseling
Center. The Center is reportedly run entirely by lawyers who are paid by
the state board to listen to grievants' legal problems. 125 The lawyers then
represent grievants whose income meets the qualification levels.
Before litigation or transfer to a L.A. court, the lawyer takes a state-
ment from the adversary party, "so that the petitioner's statement can be
verified" and "to put two sides of the stories together." '129 It usually
takes between two to three months for the Center to arrange a meeting of
both parties, where most cases are usually settled.
No traditional lawyer/client relationship exists between a legal aid
lawyer and client at the Counseling Center. One lawyer openly admitted
that the lawyers act as judges. While conciliation is voluntary, the law-
yer acts at his or her own discretion in mediating an agreement and fol-
lowing up on reconciled cases. For instance, one lawyer said there was a
six-month post-reconciliation follow-up in marital reconciliation cases,
while another said no follow-up was done. None of the materials in the
Maharashtra State Legal Aid and Advice Scheme describe follow-up
procedures.
Many women's organizations in a number of states expressed con-
cern about the state-run marital conciliation proceedings. Most of the
women seeking legal aid did so in order to obtain a divorce or to receive
maintenance from their husbands. One Bombay women's organization,
the Nahila Dahenita Sanita, a shelter for battered women, insists on
126. Mr. Nathawat also hinted at the decreased political pressure -to hold the courts after
1987. IcL supra note 111.
127. Interview with Judge Desai, Executive Chairman of the Maharashtra State Legal Aid
Board (July 4, 1989).
128. At one session of the counseling center I attended, four "counselors" were present at a
preliminary complaint, none of whom was a lawyer. Outside, over fifty applicants stood in line
for their turn.




monitoring marital reconciliation hearings by sending a representative to
every hearing. 3' The group felt this was necessary to protect the wo-
men's interests because the state seemed overly intent on "achieving rec-
onciliation at all costs, often pressuring the wife to accept all terms."1 3'
The justification for urging reconciliation in matrimonial disputes is
found in the language of the Hindu Marriage Act, which specifically calls
on Family Courts to encourage marital reconciliation. Women in India
choose divorce as a last resort; there is tremendous social and religious
pressure for women to remain married whatever the circumstances of
their troubled marriage. Some judges believed, however, that women
sometimes used divorce petitions only to harass or threaten their spouses,
or sought divorce because of trivial conflicts, and that the women had a
naive misunderstanding of the consequences they would face as
divorcees.
The Bombay women's group also voiced objections to the authority
of the lawyers at the Counseling Center, who held "many misconceptions
about a woman's role in the family," were "ill-trained and educated to
conduct such hearings," and had "an overly paternalistic attitude to-
wards women."' 32 At least one report bore these points out. Attempting
to show the success of L.A. judges in reconciling parties, one lawyer re-
counted the following story:
After three and four attempts to reconcile the parties, the wife still
refused to accept her husbands terms, and still demanded a divorce.
After the fourth failed attempt, the judge took her aside, and with a
few words, got her to reconcile with her husband within moments. He
told her, holding up a pen: 'Do you see this pen? When I buy it new
from the market, it is worth ten rupees. If I try to sell it tomorrow, it
will be worth only two rupees.1
3
The women's group said they often filed objections when a court
pressed a woman to reconcile despite evidence that her husband had
beaten and abused her.
Despite the complaints of women's groups, Maharashtra's legal aid
directors were very proud of their L.A. court program, which they call
"lok nyayalayas" (L.N. courts). From 1984 through 1985, the State re-
ported 77 L.N. courts which settled 1,562 cases. From 1985 to 1986, 170
L.N. courts settled 7,013 cases. Of these, fourteen L.N. courts exclu-
130. Interview with Mrs. Sidhvi Kavkanis, chairwoman of Nahila Dakehita Sanita Wo-
man's Organization (July 5, 1989).
131. Id
132. Id
133. Interview with lawyer in Himachal Pradesh (June 27, 1989).
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sively heard motor vehicle compensation claims cases. Between April
1986 and March 1987, 184 L.N. courts were organized, 15,981 cases
were heard, and 7,655 cases were settled. Of these, sixteen were special-
ized motor accident claims courts.
Maharashtra passed its own State Lok Nayalaya Rules in 1986,
which regulated the procedure of the L.A. courts and gave statutory rec-
ognition to L.A. court settlements. "Each [L.N. court] panel consists of
3 conciliators... such as advocates, retired judges, social workers, law
teachers, etc. The panels for matrimonial matters usually consist of lady
conciliators."
134
Immediately after a compromise is reached, it is recorded, signed,
and transferred to a judicial officer, who signs it as a final decree or order.
A hearing reportedly lasts "between five to seven minutes." "Due to the
aforesaid procedure the parties hardly get any chance to change their
minds and thus the compromise is effected finally." 1 35 No appeal is al-
lowed from the settlement.
The procedural rule allowing immediate judicial approval and dis-
posal of settled cases without the possibility of appeal created great en-
thusiasm among those involved with the L.N. courts, who had petitioned
for their formal recognition. The Director of the State Legal Aid Board
explained that "allowing parties to change their minds" after a settle-
ment was reached was "a bad idea" because parties would be subject to
the opinions of relatives, neighbors, and friends, who could encourage
rejection of a settlement and litigation. This would defeat a primary
purpose of the L.N. courts-lightening the caseload of the official courts.
The Director insisted that the parties preferred final compromises.
The Maharashtra L.N. courts appeared to achieve the best of all
worlds for the state. They facilitated the quick and cheap resolution of
disputes, kept cases out of the official system, avoided the delay and en-
cumbrance of procedural or evidentiary rules, and had full legal sanction.
CILAS Newsletters frequently reported Maharashtra's success in
holding specialized Motor Vehicle Claims L.N. courts (M.V.C.L.N.
courts). While set up as a legal aid program, the popularity of the
M.V.C.L.N. courts led the legal aid board to open them up to all appli-
cants. At the M.V.C.L.N. courts, state-owned insurance companies
could quickly resolve the compensation to be paid to an injured party.
Observations at a M.V.C.L.N. court session indicated that the pro-
ceedings merely provided a haggling forum. Neither side was very inter-




ested in the bargaining process itself, the compensation was usually
predetermined by insurance company schedules. The hearings often
lasted less than five minutes; the injured party often sat at one side of the
room and watched the attorneys discuss the matter. The role of the L.N.
judge was negligible. The entire proceedings were reminiscent of pre-
trial settlement negotiations.
Despite the traditional fee system that pays attorneys per court ap-
pearance, lawyers are able to obtain sizeable fees from the M.V.C.L.N.
court hearings although they may appear only once. A de facto system
of percentage compensation has been arranged, where an attorney can
get anywhere from ten to thirty percent of the settlement. Although the
director of the legal aid program argued that the L.N. courts "kept the
money out of lawyer's pockets," they actually offer lawyers higher fees
than traditional litigation.'36
C. Himachal Pradesh
The state of Himachal Pradesh (H.P.) stands out as an example of
an alternative to the L.A. court movement. Its unique Conciliation
Courts attempt to achieve conciliation within the formal court structure.
H.P.'s experiment has been modest, but figures show that it has suc-
ceeded in reconciling seven to eight percent of all cases filed. From Sep-
tember 1984 to May 1989, 22,937 cases were conciliated. The state
boasted that "it is remarkable in this scheme that not a single case has
come to the High Court in appeal or revision against the [reconciliation]
decree of the lower courts."' 137 Unlike the L.A. courts in other states,
Conciliation Courts continue to be steadily used to the present day. Dis-
cussions with district judges, legal aid officials, and lawyers indicate that
the experiment has been carefully monitored and administered.
The Chief Justice of H.P., Shri P.D. Desai, established the Concilia-
tion Courts in 1984 as alternatives to the L.A. courts. The court authori-
ties justified their creation as within the intent of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which enjoins courts to assist parties in settling certain types
of suits and proceedings, and within the intent of similar provisions in
the Hindu Marriage Act. 3 ' H.P. initiated the project partially because
136. Some critics of the L.N. system charge that lawyers pressured their clients into ac-
cepting a meager settlement, persuading them that they would have to wait years to get any-
thing out of litigation. There are no studies comparing compensation in settled cases and
litigated cases.
137. CILAS NEWSL., Aug. 1987, at 17.
138. The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 similarly urges judges to attempt reconciliation
before granting a divorce.
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they opposed the L.A. courts. Because of the political popularity of the
L.A. courts, however, they could advocate the successes of their system
only discreetly, with quiet reminders that they were "not outside the ex-
isting legal framework."139
Participants in the Conciliation Courts, however, more openly criti-
cized the L.A. movement. Many felt that L.A. courts used parties as
part of a "political show," and built little faith in the judicial system.
The Conciliation Courts were "far superior" because unlike L.A. courts,
they were permanently accessible, and not held on an ad hoc basis. Con-
ciliation Court judges came from the district, spoke the regional lan-
guage, and had a better grasp of local conflicts. In comparison, the
touring L.A. court judges were often from the city. Finally, Conciliation
Court judges were experienced, practicing judges, not -the hodgepodge of
social workers, law students, and housewives who often served as L.A.
court judges.
The matters referred to the Conciliation Courts pertain to petitions
under the H.P. Rent Control Act, the Hindu Marriage Act, family dis-
putes, water disputes, easement rights, maintenance claims, and motor
accident claims. 1"
Conciliation Court procedures are similar to judicially-supervised
settlement negotiations. After clerks identify cases that meet the requisite
guidelines, the cases are sent to a regular lower court which serves as a
Conciliation Court for a few days each month.
The conciliation court ... goes through the facts of the cases, taking
the help of the lawyers and the parties to the extent possible, [and]
endeavors to evolve a fair and just formula.... The judge explains to
the parties [the] prima facie merits of the case, [the] nature of evidence
required, [the] approximate time involved, and the chances of success
of either party.... Parties are thereafter left free to exercise their own
judgment. In case a settlement is arrived at a consent decree is passed,
139. CILAS NEWSL., Aug. 1987, at 17. One writer reviewing the H.P experiment
commented:
There is a difference between Lok Adalat and conciliation courts as in conciliation
courts the matters are tried just after the parties put in appearance in pursuance of
summons during the trials and even at the appellate stage. There is a sanctity of the
court stamp.. .and the matter is decided in equitable and rational and dispassionate
manner. There is full cooperation from the lawyers as well as the litigant public to
implement this scheme of conciliation. . . The only disadvantage of the scheme is
that the Judge has to be a man of endless patience and perseverance.
R.K. Mahajan, Practical Evaluation of Himchal Pradesh Experiment, JOURNAL 135, 138
(1988).
140. Mahajan, supra note 167, at 139.
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and court fees are refunded...141
The Registrar of the H.P. High Court, O.P. Verma, notes that there
are procedural safeguards which ensure that parties are not forced to
attempt reconciliation. Before a case is channeled to a Conciliation
Court, the district judge with original jurisdiction consults with the par-
ties to offer them an opportunity to settle the matter through reconcilia-
tion. The case is transferred only if both parties consent.
Recent proposals, however, suggest vesting the Conciliation Courts
with authority to sanction parties who fail to appear by dismissing their
cases with prejudice or issuing exparte judgements. Critics of the propo-
sal fear that such an expression of judicial muscle would upset the infor-
mal atmosphere of the Courts.
Whether or not parties give true voluntary consent to reconciliation
remains unclear. While judges are certainly justified in warning litigants
of the time and expense of litigation, some participants feel they cannot
refuse a district judge's advice to work things out at a Conciliation Court.
A litigant who refuses a transfer to a Conciliation Court must pursue his
or her case in front of the same district judge, and risks annoying him.
I. LOK ADALATS AND NYAYA PANCHAYATS: AN
ENCORE
The experiment with L.A. courts has largely had the same results as
the preceding experiment with N.P. courts. Both offered the Indian pop-
ulation an attempt to resolve disputes in forums believed to be most imi-
tative of the indigenous mechanisms for dispute resolution. Both were
criticized as blatant examples of the state's monopolization of autono-
mous bodies of dispute resolution. The great number of similarities be-
tween the ideologies, practice, and history of the L.A. courts and the ill-
fated N.P.s suggest that L.A. courts grew out of a desire to revive N.P.s
under a new name, with even greater central control.
The use of the Hindi term adalats, to refer to local judicial tribunals,
immediately preceded the implementation of the N.P. system. In the late
1800s, the British used the local panchayat adalati as part of their "ef-
forts to decentralize and reorganize local self-government using the insti-
tutional-form of panchayats (representative bodies)."1 42 Although these
local courts were neglected and eventually abandoned, the rhetoric of
141. CILAS NEWSL, Aug. 1987, at 16-17.
142. Meschievitz & Galanter, supra note 1, at 50.
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promoting local self-government through judicial self-administration
lasted well into modem times.
N.P.s, developed and implemented in the 1950s and 1960s, were jus-
tified as a constitutional imperative; Article 40 of the Constitution calls
for government efforts to foster local self-rule, and for the eventual de-
centralization of most major governmental functions. 143 Like the locally
elected village panchayats which would govern each village, the N.P.s
would administer the laws and resolve legal disputes locally.
The central government also sought to establish judicial panchayats
in order to fulfill the Constitutional Directive Principle of Article 50,
which called for the separation of the judiciary from the executive.
144
While the original plans called for one village panchayat to fulfill both
functions, increased responsibilities made this infeasible. "As panchayat
institutions were reorganized and oriented to a wider :range of functions,
it was felt that considerations of efficiency in performance of the assigned
developmental and governmental tasks required relief from the judicial
workload."' 4
The organization of the N.P.s was simple. Panchas (judges) were
elected indirectly from the general village or district panchayat. An N.P.
would hear small civil and criminal cases refered by three to ten village
councils, but had no enforcement powers. While they could fine parties
up to one hundred rupees, the emphasis was to be on compromise. Law-
yers could not represent parties in N.P.s, and no claims by or against the
Government could be brought there. A district magistrate reviewed the
N.P. decisions, and parties could seek transfer to a regular court if they
charged the N.P. with bias or prejudice.
Among other things, the N.P.s represented the new state's desire to
exercise judicial authority over the villages, and to provide the village
population with legal access. The N.P.s were "intended to combine the
virtues of traditional legal institutions (accessibility, informality, econ-
omy of time and money, and familiarity of legal norms) with those of the
state legal system (impartiality, uniformity of law and procedures, and
legitimacy)." '146
"N.P.s [were] endorsed on the ground that they would remove
many of the defects of the British system of administration of justice
143. R.S. Robins, Comment, India: Judicial Panchayals in Uttar Pradesh, 11 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 239 (1962).
144. Upendra Baxi & Marc Galanter, PANCHAYAT JUSTICE: AN INDIAN EXPERIMENT IN
LEGAL AccEss, in 3 AccEss TO JusTicE 343, 347 (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth eds., 1979).
145. Id. at 68.
146. Meschievitz & Galanter, supra note 1, at 47-48.
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since they would be manned by people with knowledge of local customs
and habits, attitudes, and values, familiar with the ways of living and
thought of the parties before them.""14
On the other hand, N.P.s could implement the new laws mandating
equality between men, women, and members of different castes. They
could provide the village population with a forum in which to exercise
their rights under the Indian Constitution.148
The N.P.s thus had two conflicting goals. On the one hand, they
were to promote local self-rule, implying the application of local values
and traditional customs. On the other hand, they were to promote the
laws and values of the new and progressive Indian state. The national
government intended to abolish the pre-existing caste panchayats, whose
command and influence over village life was perceived as undermining
the goals of the new polity. 149
Academics writing on N.P.s in the late 1960s and 1970s recognized
the rhetoric in the Government's argument that the N.P.s were designed
only to restore indigenous methods of dispute resolution. "N.P.s cannot
be considered to be revivals of older institutions. It may be that they are
not like other courts in India... but they are, nonetheless, courts. As
such they are fundamentally different from panchayats, totally new insti-
147. Marc Galanter, Indian Law as an Indigenous Conceptual System, in LAW AND Soct.
Ery IN MODERN INDIA 97 (1989). The benefits of the N.P.s were similar to the purposes of
the L.A. courts. One commentator explained the potential benefits of N.P.s:
It is hoped that, being part of the community, public opinion will operate to ensure
their impartiality... [and] that the intimate knowledge of the area and its customs
which the panches enjoy will make it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to manufacture
evidence or engage in vexatious suits. The fact that the proceedings are informal and
take place in the villager's own area and before people of his own type, should...
permit plaintiffs to explain their grievance more accurately In this way, justice may
be brought to the villager, and it may no longer be necessary for him to travel miles
at great expense to get a claim settled or a case tried.
Robins, supra note 143, at 239.
148. "As part of the state judicial system, NP... were to displace existing indigenous
institutions... and carry state power and a constitutionalist vision of India into the rural
areas." Meschievitz & Galanter, supra note 1, at 56.
149. mhe nyayapanchayats, consciously or otherwise, represent the extension of [the]
state legal system in rural areas. Eventual eclipse or displacement of community
dispute institutions, and eventual spread of the ideology and values of the new so-
cially desired order, through the nyayapanchayats may seem to be one desired result,
contributing to the motivation for the creation and maintenance of the nyaya
panchayats. Extension of state law, of course, means extension of political systems;
the formal polity with its hegemonial tendencies, seeks to intrude upon and minimize
the impact of, informal polity - a process in which the nyaya panchayat would be
important instruments.
THE CRISIS OF THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 32, at 325.
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tutions without any counterpart in previous cultural history." 150
Comparing panchayats to the modernization of Indian medicine,
Galanter explains that "this revival [was] really another stream of mod-
ernization,"-"traditionalization,"' which Galanter describes as a
movement that uses traditional symbols and pursues traditional values,
but engages in technological and organizational modernization. 152
Despite warnings about their true purposes and effects, the N.P.s
hardly merited apprehension; they were far from successful. Filings in
the N.P.s fell to a tenth of their original number in the course of twenty
years. 53 Eventually the entire program failed.
Observers blamed the decline of the N.P.s in part on their structural
weakness, including their limited jurisdiction and authority, small budg-
ets, and barely educated panchas. One study of N.P.s revealed "dwin-
dling caseloads, protracted dispositions, inadequate financial and
administrative support, lack of insulation from village politics, and gen-
eral apathy.
154
The N.P.s could hardly fulfill their promise to extend the norms and
laws mandated by the Constitution. "In the discharge of their statutory
functions, the nyaya panchayats are to administer justice according to the
law; but the law they are to administer requires basic training which they
150. Robert M. Hayden, Fact Discretion and Normative Implications: The Nature of Ar-
gument in a Caste Panchayat, Paper prepared for the Conference on The Career and Prospects
of Law in Modem India, Madison, Wisconsin, at 29 (June 7-10, 1932).
There is little reason to think of panchayats as a reassertion of local legal norms or
institutions. [A]dministrative panchayats have tended to act as downward channels
for the dissemination of official policies rather than as forums for the assertion of
local interests as locally conceived. It is submitted that this is the case with judicial
panchayats too. Rather than inspiring a resurgence of indigenous local law, they
may serve as agencies for disseminating official norms and procedures and further
displacing traditional local law by official law within the village.
Marc Galanter, The Aborted Restoration of Indigenous Law in India, 14 COMP. STUDIES IN
Soc. & HisT. 45, 53 (1972) [hereinafter The Aborted Restoration of Indigenous Law in India].
151. The Aborted Restoration of Indigenous Law in India, supra note 150, at 53.
152. Id
[T]he traditional panchayat symbolism and values of harmonious reconciliation and
local control and participation are combined with many organizational and technical
features borrowed from the modem legal system - statutory rules, specified jurisdic-
tion, fixed personnel, salaries, elections, written records, etc. The movement to
panchayats then is not a restoration of traditional law, but its containment and ab.
sorption; not an abandonment of the modem legal system, but its extension in the
guise of tradition.
IdL
153. See Baxi & Galanter, supra note 144.
154. Meschievitz & Galanter, supra note 1, at 55.
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do not have." ' They also failed in their attempt to adopt traditional
panchayat symbolism without the weaknesses of traditional panchayat
practices. The N.P.s could not avoid the partiality of the traditional
panchayat.156 Yet they also did not succeed in fostering the panchayat
virtues of providing a forum for informal reconciliation.157 "Instead,
nyaya panchayats seem in large measure to have achieved a rather un-
palatable combination of the mechanical formalism of the courts with the
political malleability of traditional dispute processing."'15 8
Despite the practical failure of the N.P.s, the central government
and the academic community remained dedicated to thepanchayat ideol-
ogy: "a belief in the efficacy of the panchayat in resolving disputes in
rural areas in the face of strongly inconsistent evidence."15 9 Government
studies, including the Bhagwati/lyer National Juridicare Report, contin-
ued to recommend larger budgets and enhanced jurisdiction for the
N.P.s. Their supporters hoped to reform the institutions so they could
155. Baxi & Galanter, supra note 144, at 89.
156. Robins, supra note 143, at 245.
157. Meschievitz & Galanter, supra note 1, at 69.
158. Baxi & Galanter, supra note 144, at 90.
The principal accusation has been that of partiality... Because the social and polk-
ical life of rural India revolves around caste and religious community the impartiality
of any citizen is difficult to maintain, and even where maintained, is always suspect.
.... The problem becomes more acute when it is recalled that the members of the
nyaya panchayats are political leaders in their area... Another difficulty.., is that
the panches are known, and frequently distantly related, to the plaintiff There can
seldom be that impersonality that is considered so essential to justice according to
conventional canons. On the contrary, the system is deliberately designed to en-
courage the personal knowledge of plaintiff and judge.
Robins, supra note 143, at 245.
What was to be a neutral, unbiased body of local leaders helping to negotiate and
mediate petty disputes has either become a stronghold of landed elites and dominant
castes or, in other localities, been stillborn. NP are perceived by villagers as alien
institutions and therefore are used no more than the regular courts. Indeed, they
have manifested the worst attributes of traditional and more modem legal institu-
tions. Those with access to the state courts gain little by returning to the rural set-
ting and using NP. Those without such resources must assess their opportunities
within the village before challenging the dominant faction by going to the NP.
...The decline in caseloads suggests that people originally used NP as an alternative
forum but have since found them less satisfactory. Increases in regular court use, on
the other hand, indicate that these institutions remain viable and suggest that those
who are willing and able to abandon local institutions will bypass NP and go to the
state courts.
Meschievitz & Galanter, supra note 1, at 69.
The pathos of the NP is that they have achieved neither the impartiality of the regu-
lar courts (at their best) nor the intimacy, informality and ability to conciliate of
traditional panchayats (at their best).
Baxi & Galanter, supra note 144, at 90.
159. Meschievitz & Galanter, supra note 1, at 56.
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play a key role in the legal aid movement. The recommendations that
Iyer's Expert Committee made for N.P.s emphasized extreme informality
coupled with formal authority:
Intelligent informality, consistent with natural justice, must inform the
methodology of these [N.P.] lay courts. Powers of interim relief and
interlocutory procedure exercised by civil courts must be available to
them.... The Indian Evidence Act should not be applied.... Elabo-
rate reasons need not be given in the judgments... but brief grounds
may be indicated .... These courts should not be allowed to be by-
passed and so must have exclusive jurisdiction.... Execution of de-
crees and orders and sentence must be made by the panchayat court
itself... [It] shall have the discretion to suggest a just settlement...
and if rejected by one party... there must be power to impose penal
costs.... Lawyers will not ordinarily be allowed to appear .... 160
The recommendations included staffing the N.P.s with retired
judges and staff with at least rudimentary legal training, implying that
the N.P.s were "no longer commended as an embodiment of traditional
values." '61 Such staffing, however, would keep the N.P.s "outside the
villages; panchas would become strangers; powers would not be en-
hanced. If the N.P. were impartial, they might be preferable to more
partisan local bodies, but their weak powers of enforcement and limited
jurisdiction would militate against their use."
162
No state adopted the recommendations for reforming the N.P.s;
some states abolished N.P.s completely. Instead, the recommendations
for reforming the N.P.s were used in new experiments with L.A. courts.
IV. LOK ADALA TS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
EXPERIMENT WITH INFORMAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
L.A. courts promised to operate informally and to achieve results
superior to the official courts. They offered the possibility of conciliated
160. GOV'T OF MADHYA PRADESH, supra note 4, at 187. The study by Mcschievitz and
Galanter revealed that this "panchayat ideology" was shared with the village population, who
remained devoted to NPs. Villagers defended NPs as closer to their homes and less expensive
than formal courts, while criticizing local courts for "delays, expense, and bad decisions." The
villagers, however, "admitted they had never gone to either." Meschievitz & Galanter, supra
note 1, at 57. The continued expressions of support for NPs among the village population is
explained by Meschievitz and Galanter as support for access to merely one more dispute forum
where conflict and negotiation could be waged. Id. at 68.
161. Id. at 70. Meschievitz and Galanter assessed these recommendations in terms of en-




settlements that would leave all parties happy. They would be unbur-
dened by the procedures and rules of formal courts, and accessible to
even the least educated villager. They would be true "people's courts."
At the same time, by inducing the population to resolve disputes within
state forums, they would extend the rights and values of the state.
This Article first presented the history of the legal aid movement to
provide an understanding of the motivations behind this experiment in
informal dispute resolution. Second, the Article evaluated available data
on the actual practice of L.A. courts. Third, it explained the history of
N.P.s in order to reveal recurring themes and issues in the behavior of
the L.A. courts. In this final section, the Article assesses the experience
of L.A. courts in light of western critiques of movements for legal
informalism.
Theorists studying state experiments with informal dispute resolu-
tion often describe them as a thinly veiled effort to extend state control
into areas where the formal legal system has had little success. Com-
menting on the American experience, for example, Steven Spitzer notes
the paradox in current proposals for informal justice. They are rational-
ized by advocates of "delegalization" and "decentralization" as a means
to promote the strength and autonomy of local social units; they do not
recognize, however, that this dispersion of control is an effective expan-
sion of centrally organized and managed social control, "thinning the
mesh and widening the net" of the central authority. 163 As Foucault
argued, informal justice actually increases state power by allowing its
control to escape the walls of the highly visible centers of coercion, such
as courts, prisons, mental hospitals, and schools.'"
Both the N.P. and L.A. courts used the rhetoric of promoting local
self-rule, where justice is administered before social peers. Unlike the
establishment of villagepanchayats, which made uniform the structure of
government that each village or tribe would use, N.P. and L.A. courts
provided far more than a uniform structure for the administration ofjus-
tice. They also impose the state's laws and constitution, and thus serve
as conduits for the extension of rules which are often very foreign to local
ways and customs.
L.A. courts represent an even greater displacement of local rule
than N.P.s because its judges or "conciliators" are often not even from
the local community, as was the case with N.P.s. Instead, prominent
163. Steven Spitzer, Dialectics of Formal and Informal Control, in 2 THe POLTICS OF
INFORMAL JusTIcE, supra note 1, at 187-190.
164. Quoted in Abel, supra note 17, at 6.
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social figures, social workers, and retired judges pass through local com-
munities to staff the L.A. courts. The recommendations for reforming
the N.P.s, later implemented in the L.A. courts, urged that judges be
detached from the local community to avoid the problems of partiality.
Instead, they sought to rely on the values and understandings of relative
strangers in order to resolve local disputes.
Critics argue that this extension of state power also "undermines
extrastate modes of informal control." '165
Informal justice purports to devolve state authority on nonstate insiti-
tutions, to delegate social control... But in fact informalism expands
the grasp of the state at the expense of other sources of authority that
appear to be potential competitiors. Indeed a precondition for the sur-
vival of informal justice in civil society appears to be the inaccessiblity
of competing state institutions. When the official state legal system,
formal and informal, is highly remote and inhospitable, then true in-
formal justice thrives outside it. Reforms that increase access to state
control-of which informalism is an example-draw clients away from
nonstate institutions and distort the processes of the latter." 
1 66
Both the L.A. courts and the N.P.s encouraged parties to approach
the state forums instead of the competing non-state legal systems of
caste, community and tribal-basedpanchayats, whose authority was con-
sidered inimical to the goals of the state. By creating forums with fea-
tures considered appealing by the village population, the state hoped to
divert and control conflicts in its own forums.
The L.A. court movement explicitly endorsed this goal. The Legal
Services Act, in accord with CILAS' guidelines, prohibited non-state or-
ganizations or groups from administering independent L.A. courts. All
L.A. courts required state approval, cooperation, or financing. The
Legal Services Act also required that L.A. court judges associate closely
with the state. Only retired judges, lawyers, and social workers were al-
lowed to serve as L.A. court judges. As one commentator explained,
"[S]tate informalism not only expropriates conflict from the parties but
also reduces participation by other citizens in the handling of disputes.
State informal institutions substitute paraprofessional state employees for
citizen jurors." 
167
"If... the growth of informal legal institutions extends state social
control, this does not mean that [it is] necessarily effective." 1 6 The cen-
165. Id. at 277.
166. Id. at 275.
167. Id at 277.
168. Id at 278.
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tral government's promotion of its own legal system throughout the
country was designed to uniformally extend its laws and constitutional
values, and to displace potentially conflicting local customs and
practices.
169
As with the N.P. courts, however, the very informality and flexibil-
ity of the courts have militated against any uniform extension of norms
and values. Without procedural and evidentiary rules, consistent record-
keeping, or adherence to statutes and precedents, uniformity could
hardly be assured.
The very notion that the L.A. courts offered relief from the complex
and impractical legal process implies that the courts promoted something
other than the rule of law. If "lawyer's law" is "the enterprise of subject-
ing human conduct to the governance of rules" where rules are "formal,
explicit and deliberately instituted, ' 170 L.A. courts, as "anti-rule, anti-
lawyer's law" forums, may indeed not have been the best way to govern.
What L.A. courts offered in the place of "lawyer's law" remains
unclear. Unlike N.P.s, L.A. courts have not attempted to encourage the
resolution of disputes by local judges according to local customs and
rules. L.A. court judges, who only occasionally come from the area and
have some legal experience, have offered only ad hoc opinions designed
only to terminate disputes as quickly as possible. As Judge Iyer de-
scribed the L.A. courts shortly after passage of the Legal Services Act,
they are "neither fish, nor flesh, nor good red herring!"''
Some evidence suggests that L.A. court judges have influenced set-
169. Some commentators have objected to even such a goal: "Do we want a world in which
there is perfect penetration of norms downward through the pyramid so that all disputes are
resolved by application of the authoritative norms propounded by the courts? .... uniformity
of meaning across time and space is an achievement purchased at substantial cost." Marc
Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law, 19 J. OF
LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 4-5 (1981).
170. Richard Abel, supra note 17, at 6, quoting Fuller (1964). One commentator described
the system as having accomplished this unity of laws:
The modem legal system may be viewed as an important unifying element. While
previously there were wider networks of marriage, ritual activity, pilgrimage and
economic and military activity, until the advent of the modem system, law and jus-
tice were in good part purely local concerns. Today, while India has no single na-
tion-wide system of caste, kinship, religion or land-tenure, there is an all-India legal
system which handles local disputes in accordance with uniform national standards.
This... provides not only a common textual tradition but also a machinery for insur-
ing that this tradition is applied in all localities in accordance with nationally pre-
scribed rules and procedures rather than dissolved into local interpretations.
Marc Galanter, The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India, 24 J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES
65, 26 (1968).
171. IYER, supra note 19, at 49.
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tlements according to their own personal values and beliefs, particularly
in matrimonial cases. At other times, the high level of politicization has
apparently subjected the L.A. court to the influence of local leaders. The
dangers of such influence have been widely commented on:
[T]he whole point of much modem legislation in India... has been to
'conflict' with preexisting local views of justice. Given the inherent
clash between a legal framework that promotes legal values and a cul-
ture that has not put a high premium on such values, the importance
of forums as immune as possible from the influence of local elites is
clear.
172
The limited success of the L.A. courts in achieving lasting concilia-
tion between parties,173 and in establishing popular forums for dispute
settlement can in part be explained by the relationships of the parties
appearing before them. Often, disputants have a long history of caste or
tribal conflict. Additionally, the types of cases, particularly matrimonial
cases, heard by the L.A. courts may have made success difficult, a com-
mon difficulty that informal institutions face:
Contemporary informal institutions devote substantial energies to pre-
cisely those situations ... conflict between intimates expressing deep-
rooted emotions... [which] they are least able to resolve. 174
One rationale urges that diverting such problems to informal courts
where matters are amicably settled could minimize the tension tradition-
ally associated with bringing private matters to official courts. In re-
sponse to critics who objected to the extension of courts into family
matters, for example, Iyer gave a qualified defense for legal aid in matri-
monial matters:
It is for the substantive law to lay down the conditions under which a
marriage might be dissolved. Once it recognizes the desirability of di-
vorce by permitting it in certain conditions, ... , it would not be cor-
rect for the legal aid machinery to interpose an obstacle in the way of
securing a right which the legislature had considered desirable to con-
fer upon the parties in order to avoid suffering and hardship.
.. However ... to ensure that as far as possible, family matters are
not brought to the Court, we recommend that Legal Aid should not
normally be given for the institution of any proceedings for divorce...
or for the custody of children, unless an attempt has been made by the
172. Richard K. Gordon, Jr. & Jonathon M. Lindsay, Law and the Poor in Rural India:
The Prospects for Legal Aid 141 (1989) (publication pending).
173. No state reported more than a twenty percent success rate in lasting conciliation.
174. Abel, supra note 17, at 278.
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Legal Aid Committee to effect... reconciliation between the parties,
and the aforesaid person agrees to a reasonable settlement."7
Iyer's statement captures the tension between a national vision of rights
based on equality and justice and local visions based on hierarchy and
tradition. This tension is similar to the tension between the constitu-
tional promise of social liberation and the promise for decentralized judi-
cial administration, local self-rule, and popular justice free from the
artifice and deceit associated with the formal courts.
The legal aid movement expressed these tensions by pursuing two
different goals at once. One goal, spearheaded by Justice Bhagwati,
sought to provide the socially and economically oppressed masses with
access to the formal legal system through free legal assistance and
widescale public interest litigation.
The second goal sought to create an informal system of dispute reso-
lution, aimed primarily at the problems and disputes of the poor who had
been frustrated by the formal system. Local conflicts would be deflected
away from central authority and hopefully dissipated through reconcilia-
tion. The delay, cost, and oppression of the formal system would be
avoided.
Weber explains such simultaneous movements in the legal system
for formalization and informalization as expressive of the friction be-
tween substantive and procedural law, and as part of the dialectic be-
tween law and justice. Democratic societies offer justice in the shape of
equality before the law and legal guarantees in formal and rule-bound
judicial systems, as opposed to the arbitrary and rampant discretion of
the chambers of absolute rulers.176 Yet the "ethos" of the democratic
masses, sometimes born out of irrational sentiment, often calls for sub-
stantive justice of a different sort in individual cases, and collides with
the cool and calculable bureaucratic administration of the law.17 7 Bour-
geois laws hardly appear just to the propertyless masses, for example,
when they serve to evict an elderly woman from her tenement apart-
ment. 7 1 Popular justice, Weber explains, must be informal if it is to
accepted as ethical.17 9
175. GOV'T OF INDIA, supra note 10, at 61.
176. Spitzer, supra note 163, at 171-72.
177. Id.
178. lId
179. Id "They tend not to handle problems more susceptible to a quick, superficial rem-
edy - conflict between relative strangers over a narrow issue with a shallow history .... The
pressure to confront such problems is far less strong... and they are far less equipped to
handle such problems: They lack sufficient power to compel the parties to participate or to
comply with the agreement.. . ." Id
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The translation of this debate into the formal/informal division is
related to a desire to see one's vision of social justice fulfilled. Following
Weber's comments, Spitzer notes that as the rhetoric for equality before
the law and formal, rule-bound systems increases, the law is transformed
into an "unassailable, abstract and reified tool" of the ruling, propertied
elite; '8 calls for social justice and challenges to legal authority by the
masses, most victimized by the system, appear irrational and more and
more unattainable.181
The legal aid movement sought to vindicate the rights of the poor
through the formal courts, where equality under the Constitution would
guarantee victories, and where the weight of unequal bargaining posi-
tions could be alleviated. However, the formal system had a negative
impact because of its inordinate cost and delays, inflexibility, and inap-
proachability. To avoid these harms, the legal aid movement advocated
an informal alternative as part of its overall program.
Soon, however, public interest litigation shrunk from the agenda of
the national legal aid movement, depending instead on the impetus of
private organizations who sought reform through high impact litigation.
The informal movement embodied in the L.A. courts became CILAS'
main focus.
The success and popularity of L.A. courts, however, prompted calls
for greater formality and statutory recognition. Officials involved with
the L.A. courts argued for expanded jurisdiction, official sanction to set-
tlements, and authority to levy fines. The Legal Services Act fulfilled
these requests. The L.A. courts were professionalized and excluded non-
professionals by requiring that only lawyers or retired judges serve as
judges, Thus, the advocates for informality succeeded in formalizing the
courts as much as possible.
Critics explain such reciprocal movements away from informalism
as a natural development in the bureaucratization of any state body.
Once the alternatives are in business, their staff develop a 'professional'
stake in increasing caseload .... The professional staff in informal
institutions may seek to enhance their status and authority by adopting
the trappings of formalism: . .. [I]nformalism depends on levels of
moral enthusiasm, consensus, and suasion that are very difficult to sus-
tain; rather than constantly struggling to revivify commitment, legal
institutions may fall back on more coercive, hierarchical means of so-
cial control and dispute settlement.
18 2
180. Id. at 171.
181. Id.
182. Abel, supra note 17, at 4-5.
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The formalization of the L.A. courts affected not only their proce-
dure, but also solidified full state control by prohibiting non-state organi-
zations from holding L.A. courts themselves. "The state [felt] threatened
by the existence of autonomous informal institutions and actively sup-
pressed them."' 83
State legal aid boards came to rely more and more on their capacity
to coerce those applying for legal aid to appear before conciliation
boards. Some states, like Maharashtra, made acceptance of the informal
courts a condition for receiving legal aid.
Perhaps the most serious criticism of movements that advocate con-
ciliation is the negative effect they have on the rights of the parties to the
conciliation. Western feminists have long been skeptical of the use of
conciliation and mediation in family disputes. The promotion of family
mediation is seen as a product of an "essentially romantic view of mar-
riage... premised on the notions that families should be protected from
the intrusiveness of the justice system, and that problems within families
are best solved through informal remedies that help the parties to com-
municate more effectively.""' However, shifting these disputes outside
of the formal system also shifts the rights of women out of the public
adgenda:
Mediation trivializes family law issues by relegating them to a lesser
forum. It diminishes the public perception of the relative importance
of laws addressing women's and children's rights in the family by plac-
ing these rights outside society's key institutional system of dispute res-
olution-the legal system-while continuing to allow corporate and
other 'important' matters to have unfettered access to that system.1
8 5
In a review of mediation of wife-abuse cases, for example, Lisa
Lerman notes that informal mediation substitutes reconciliation and
compromise for the redress that the institution has no authority to grant.
The abused woman's complaint is destablized and trivialized, because the
mediator examines it in the context of the "grievances" of both sides, and
prepares the woman to accept the solution: compromise. Informalism
offers a way out of clashing norms, "clothed in forms of consent," but at
a heavy cost to the grievant, who "relinquishes something valuable and
valued."'
86
183. Id. at 5.
184. Lisa Lerman, Mediation of Wife-Abuse Case The Adyerse Impact oflnformal Dispute
Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WoMEN's L.J. 57, 61 (1984).
185. Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law Issues, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REvIEw 431, 432 (1985).
186. Abel supra note 17, at 293.
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In India, the entire conciliation effort has been directed through the
state legal aid programs. It has aimed entirely at urging the poor, who
are mainly women, members of scheduled castes and tribes, and small
landowners, and who are most in need of the protections their legal
rights offer them, to compromise their rights.
The same problems identified with mediation of family disputes in
the West are widely prevalent in India's L.A. courts. Justice Iyer
soothed conservative fears by promising that reconciliation would always
precede litigation in matrimonial affairs. Women's organizations in all
four Indian states examined have recorded their opposition to such rec-
onciliation; they overwhelmingly noted that L.A. courts put too much
pressure on women seeking divorce to reconcile instead.
The negative effects of conciliation-oriented institutions on collec-
tive rights undermine one of the original aims of the legal aid movement:
vindication of the rights of the poor and oppressed through class action
or public interest litigation. By instructing each party to resolve contro-
versies alone, informal institutions disorganize the grievances of the dom-
inated and stifle collective responses.1 87 They measure their success in
the numbers of cases they resolve, rather than in their impact on the
community or attainment of any substantive goals.' t t
Baxi notes the danger of India's reliance on conciliation for dispute
resolution. Instead of heightening the citizens' sense of rights, and refin-
ing laws to serve group interests, conciliation simply offers an unprinci-
pled method of handling disputes; compromise and bargaining encourage
old rules and prejudices to flourish, and subvert the -progressive legisla-
tion designed to combat these prejudices.18 9
Commentators note that the lack of procedural formality also im-
perils the hard-won rights of the poor. The blind application of formal
rules often create "pockets of leverage" for the disadvantaged to chal-
lenge oppressive relationships. 90 Indeed, the distance and legitimate an-
tagonistic behavior between parties characteristic of procedural formality
may encourage such challenges. 9 Informal procedures create a more
flexible and precise instrument for the goals of the privileged, and elimi-
nate any possible leverage that the disadvantaged can gain from the rigid-
187. Id at 6-7.
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ity of the formal system.192 Instead of distance, they promote a false
sense of integration with hierarchy, and of a common cause in
compromise. 1
93
In India, the emphasis on conciliation and the thrust of the informal
movement grew out of the politically powerful elite's presumptions about
the poor and oppressed. They justified the L.A. courts not as mecha-
nisms to serve state interests (which were said to only incidentally bene-
fit), but as courts designed to serve the interests of those excluded from
the formal legal system.
Critics have frequently noted that informal systems commonly dress
up the interests of the dominant groups as the wishes of the dominated.
Informalists point to the economic crises of overcrowded courts, and de-
scribe some cases as "inappropriate" for litigation. Rather than adapting
existing courts, certain matters are pushed into alternative institutions.
They claim to speak for the "people," who are dissatisfied with the courts
and prefer speedy, cheap, and more personal institutions.'
94
Yet segregating "smaller cases" to alternative institutions only ac-
centuates and verifies the perception that courts serve only corporate in-
terests. "The people" must choose between efficiency or justice; they
must accept a "compromise that purports to restore a peace that never
really existed" and give up "the leverage of state power to obtain the
redress that is theirs by right."'195
The L.A. courts regularly offered such justifications for shifting dis-
putes to its own forums. However, recent evidence challenges these be-
liefs about the relationship of the poor to the Indian legal system.
Indeed, the traditional understandings about the failure of the formal
legal system to meet the needs of the poor and rural population appears
to be based more on myth than actual experience.
Most mythical of these beliefs is the argument that the formal sys-
tem is foreign and inaccessible to the general population. However, a
growing body of evidence challenges this notion. Some of the very argu-
ments used to promote conciliation, such as the problems with over-
loaded courts and an overly litigious society, indicate that the formal
system is being used by the population. Whether the system is dispropor-
tionately used by the middle and upper classes and whether it is effective
are two entirely different issues. As one researcher commented,
192. Id
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"whether appropriate or not, [the system is] very well entrenched." 1 96
"While these systems may have once been 'Western,' they are now
clearly indigenous. The question is no longer whether they are appropri-
ate, but to what end they are working."
1 97
Much of the disapproval of the formal legal system has actually fo-
cused on the way the village population "misused" the system to manip-
ulate the courts for ends unrelated to the legal dispute at issue.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the courts have been used to serve interests
identified by the population itself:
Even though there are inadequacies of procedure and scope for chican-
ery and cheating... the present court system is not an alien or im-
posed institution but part of the life of the village. Looked at from the
perspective of the lawyer's law and that of the judges and higher civil
servants, the ability of some peasants to use the court for their own
ends would appear a perversion of the system. However, looked at
from the ground up it would appear that many in the rural areas have
learned to use the courts for their own ends often with astuteness and
effectiveness.198
Despite the complexity of the laws and beliefs that the formal sys-
tem is culturally irrelevant for the vast majority of Indians, actual field
studies reveal that there has been success in interpreting and adapting the
courts to meet individual and local needs. R.S. Khare, in his examina-
tion of the actual workings of "lawyer's law" in Indian indigenous cul-
ture, concluded that villagers and city-residents had adapted effectively
to the formal legal system through the development of local "touts," who
serve as liasons and translators to lawyers and their local clients. This
network of communication has incorporated the formal system as a cred-
ible and useful tool for the resolution of socio-economic disputes in vil-
lages across India, despite the bureaucratic complexities. 199
A more recent survey of legal aid in India critiqued the notion that
the legal system is particularly alien or mysterious to the rural Indian
poor because it is an imported system; instead, they noted that complex
legal systems universally baffle the general public. 2 °°
Finally, in contrast to the legal informalists, some researchers have
argued that the best kind of legal aid for the poor is the direct legal serv-
ices of a lawyer. "Legal representation, backed by a threat to go to court,
196. Gordon & Lindsay, supra note 172, at 139.
197. Id.
198. Cohn, supra note 24, at 108-09.
199. Khare, supra note 23, at 94.
200. Gordon & Lindsay, supra note 172, at 138.
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could help the lower jatis in securing numerous benefits guaranteed by
government."' Such assistance could go a long way towards integrat-
ing the formal system, insofar as it leads to a quick realization on the part
of the "have-nots" that the legal process could be used for securing rights
from other villagers. 2
While unequal bargaining positions may influence outcomes even in
the formal system, the procedural safeguards of the formal system offer
security that an informal system does not. "A lower jati disputant may
well be at a disadvantage in an Indian court because of the disparities in
socio-economic status between him and his opponent... such disadvan-
tages, however, are inevitably magnified in an informal dispute settle-
ment situation.1
20 3
Indeed, some theorists argue that litigation substantively reduces the
costs of social and economic inequalities. "Adversarial contest may lead
to a long-run improvement in personal relations, a kind of Hegelian 'rein-
tegration at a higher level' in which struggle makes it possible for the
parties to reconcile with a sense of dignity and mutual respect that would
formerly have been impossible." 2'
The same arguments used to justify informal legal institutions in the
interests of the poor seem intended to relieve the crisis of the formal legal
system, and thus serve the immediate interests of the state. The flood of
litigation and the tremendously publicized costs and delays of the official
courts have put tremendous pressure on the state to reform the judicial
system.
With the expanding use of the courts by the masses, and a legal aid
program that at least promised to expand access even farther, the crisis
promised to grow. By directing a large number of litigants into alterna-
tive courts, some of the strain on the formal system could be relieved.
Particularly in family disputes or claims for compensation in industrial
or motor vehicle accident claims, which were considered unimportant,
the government could meet its obligations inexpensively and quickly.
The expansion of free legal services, social welfare legislation, and
civil rights in the the 1960s and 1970s in the United States caused similar
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results and responses. As the problems of the poor and previously unrep-
resented flooded the courtrooms, business and traditional users of the
system found it more difficult to use the system.2"' Their discontent
stimulated a movement to shove these new cases into alternative forums,
"institutionalizing the informal legal practices the courts had followed
when the poor were unrepresented."20 6 Viewed as too trivial and costly
for full due process rights, the poor moved their cases to forums heard by
"nonjudicial hearing officers, unfamiliar with evidentiary and procedural
rules, ... [in] trials so brief they can be measured with an egg timer."
20 7
Such egg timer hearings, while boasted about by L.A. court officials,
are seen as further evidence by critics that the L.A. courts are merely
second-class forums of justice for the poor. It is no accident that L.A.
courts were promoted through the legal aid program. It is unbelievable
that any other sector of society could accept such a recipe for justice.
The L.A. courts were intended to legitimize the state judicial system
by creating accessible and approachable forums that displaced non-state
systems, and thereby integrate a wider range of the population into the
state's authority. Additionally, the LA courts would reduce the pressure
on the formal system, whose collapse was deemed imminent.
However, the L.A. courts may have magnified the legal crisis, by
reminding litigants that they have no chance for ju;tice in the formal
courts. Commenting on the Lok Adalat at Rangpur, Baxi notes that one
of the latent effects of the L.A. court dispute resolution is not only an
exposure of the formal courts as a failed and inappropriate system, but
also an acquiescence to the failure. The very success of the L.A. court
system pacifies and dulls the urgent demand of those who call for an
immediate reform of the state judicial system, and limits the pressure on
the government for self-correction.20 8 Despite the aim of L.A. courts to
fashion a new system of dispute resolution, they perpetuate the defects of
the formal legal system.20 9
The expenditure of money and energy on L.A. courts causes con-
cern to the extent that the legal system may be better off correcting the
deficiencies of the formal system, by increasing the number of courts and
judges and by reforming court procedures which allow delays and
abuses. To the extent the evidence suggests that the L.A. court experi-
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ment, like the N.P.s, has failed, we need not fear that they can indefi-
nitely be used to avoid the crisis. Perhaps we need only worry that a new
alternative will be developed to provide yet another opportunity to avoid
the crisis of the formal system.

